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INTRODUCTION
Complaints about the unfairness of the social security pension sys-
tem have become common. There are many variations on this theme,
but the core of the unfairness claim is the failure of social security pen-
sions to replicate the payment and benefit distribution structure of an
"actuarially fair" insurance scheme. Middle- and high-income individ-
uals would do better in such a private system. In this Article, I will
argue that there is, indeed, unfairness in the social security tax and
payments scheme, but that it is very nearly the opposite of the problem
identified by private insurance advocates. Viewed from the perspective
of overall retirement security, particularly when one considers how in-
come tax expenditures (the revenue losses attributable to special federal
income tax provisions) now shape that policy, the real fairness
problems with social security are the regressivity of its tax structure
and its modest capacity to maintain the standard of living of low and
moderate wage earners. Moreover, an integrated view of both social
security and income tax expenditures for employer-provided pensions
and individual retirement savings reveals serious problems of relying on
these generally applauded tax expenditures to implement national re-
tirement security policies. At the same time, these tax expenditure pro-
visions may place important tax policy concerns at risk.
Commentators typically describe a tripartite system that enables
and encourages the provision of income security for individuals in the
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years following their retirement from the workforce: Social Security,
employer-provided pensions, and individual savings. After acknowledg-
ing the existence of these three components of our national retirement
security program, however, analysts routinely focus exclusively on one
or another aspect. To a large extent, this compartmentalization of anal-
ysis of the retirement security issue reflects a compartmentalization of
expertise. For example, there are experts on federal taxes other than
social security, experts on federal spending other than social security,
experts on Social Security, and experts on private pensions. These ex-
perts rarely seem to communicate with one another and, indeed, seem
often to be operating with independent and often unrelated criteria for
their evaluations and policy recommendations. In this Article, I treat all
three elements-Social Security, employer-provided pensions, and indi-
vidual savings-as separate parts of an overall effort to provide a co-
herent and unified national retirement security policy.
An effort to analyze these three aspects of retirement security pol-
icy as a unified system is inherently complex. It is difficult to conceive
of a wider spectrum of public policy mechanisms intended to implement
a single goal. At one extreme is Social Security, a mandatory national
public program financed by the federal government's power to tax, ful-
filled by the government's power to spend,' and explicitly redistribu-
tional in both purpose and effect-redistributional both across genera-
tions and within the same generation.2 At the opposite extreme is
1 See generally Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (upholding the constitu-
tionality of the old-age benefit features of the Social Security Act); Steward Mach. Co.
v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (upholding the constitutionality of the unemployment
compensation features of the Social Security Act); Cohen, The Development of the So-
cial Security Act of 1935: Reflections Some Fifty Years Later, 68 U. MINN. L. REv.
379, 399-403 (1983) (discussing the historical context of the two foregoing Davis
opinions).
2 The distribution of social security benefits was intended from the outset to pro-
vide a minimum level of retirement security for all workers. See Musgrave, A Reap-
praisal of Social Security Financing, in SOCIAL SECURITY FINANCING 89, 97, 106-07
(F. Skidmore ed. 1981). Thus, Social Security provides proportionately larger benefits
to lower-paid workers than to higher-paid workers. See N. Altman Lupu, Rethinking
Retirement Income Policies: Nondiscrimination, Integration and the Quest for Worker
Security 52 (1986) (forthcoming in 42 TAx L. REv. (Spring 1987)). The pay-as-you-
go financing mechanism of Social Security creates a redistribution of income from
workers currently paying social security payroll taxes to retired workers. This financ-
ing method, coupled with rapidly increasing payroll tax rates, is viewed by many cur-
rent workers as a wealth~transfer to the older population. See A. Munnell, The Cur-
rent Status of Social Security Financing 2 (rev. ed. Dec. 19, 1985) (unpublished
manuscript presented at Yale University Institution for Social and Policy Studies Fo-
rum on the Future of Social Security); J. Tobin, The Future of Social Security: One
Economist's Assessment 4 (Feb. 1985) (forthcoming as chapter 2 of SOCIAL SECURITY
IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICS (T. Marmor & J. Mashaw eds. 1987)); Bos-
kin, Kotlikoff, Puffert, & Shoven, Social Security: A Financial Appraisal Across and
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reliance on individual savings as a source of retirement security, a
predominantly private program, with the individual (or the family)
composing the relevant unit. Individual retirement savings are often re-
garded as largely unaffected by direct government action, although fed-
eral tax policy has played an important role, sometimes encouraging
and sometimes inhibiting such savings.' Bridging these two public/pri-
vate extremes are employer-provided pensions, voluntary private pro-
grams encouraged through income tax reductions, regulated by govern-
ment, both directly and as to the many requirements that must be met
to qualify for tax benefits,4 and backed, at least in a limited way, by an
insurance system of national scope.5 Taken together, then, these three
retirement security sources reflect a full spectrum of policy initiatives: a
federal social program for all Americans, an individualistic program
dependent principally upon familial self-reliance, and a pluralistic com-
munitarian program involving both employers and employees.
This Article concentrates on equitable and distributional aspects of
the retirement security problem, although the unified view taken here
seems essential to an adequate assessment of the fairness or efficacy
either of the three components taken together or of any one of the three.
Moreover, because tax legislation serves as the dominant public mecha-
nism for implementing national retirement policy, whether through
funding Social Security via the payroll tax or providing tax incentives
for both private pensions and individual savings, a unified view of re-
tirement security policy highlights interrelationships, confluences, and
potential conflicts between retirement security and tax policy concerns.
This Article examines these interrelationships and advances a va-
riety of policy recommendations. Part I lays the groundwork for a na-
tional retirement security policy by describing the goals of such a pro-
gram and, in particular, the critical role of federal tax policy in
implementing our retirement security program. Parts II through IV
then provide, respectively, analyses of the payroll tax, employer-pro-
vided pensions, and individual savings for retirement, discussing each in
relation to a unified national retirement security policy. The Article
Within Generations, 40 NAT'L TAX J. 19, 22 (1987). This Article does not address
concerns regarding the intergenerational distribution of Social Security; Social Security
is only one component of the retirement equity problem.
3 See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON PENSION POLICY, COMING OF AGE:
TOWARD A NATIONAL RETIREMENT INCOME POLICY 44 (1981) [hereinafter COMING
OF AGE] ("Tax policy has encouraged individual retirement savings only to a limited
extent.").
4 See, e.g., A. MUNNELL, THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 30-61 (1982)
(discussing the relationship between income tax incentives and private pension plans).
5 See infra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
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concludes by suggesting possible directions for a more fair retirement
program.
I. A NATIONAL RETIREMENT SECURITY POLICY
A. Goals
At the outset one should describe the goals of retirement security
policy in order to measure the success or failure of the current mix of
public and private programs and to determine whether these programs
comprise a coherent whole in addressing the retirement security prob-
lem. The shortfall in income upon retirement is lost income from la-
bor.' Thus, while there are no doubt disagreements at the margin, re-
placement of some significant portion of preretirement wages must be
the fundamental goal of retirement security policy. Retirement security
also implies that the replacement of preretirement labor income will
ensure for the retiree the maintenance of an adequate retirement in-
come that will both protect the elderly from widespread poverty7 and
generally ensure against an abrupt decline in a retiree's lifestyle.'
Further refinement of this goal, for example by specifying an ap-
propriate percentage of wages that should be replaced for various cate-
gories of earners upon retirement, no doubt will prove more controver-
sial. From a public policy perspective, a higher percentage of
preretirement wages must be replaced for low- and moderate-income
workers even though some percentage of income should be replaced for
all workers. Thus, a national retirement policy that includes both a
basic adequacy of income component and a lifestyle maintenance con-
cern must, to some degree, be redistributional in overall effect. It would
be indefensible consciously to construct a national retirement security
program that replaces a greater percentage of wages for high- than for
moderate- and low-income earners. At the limit, of course, by the defi-
nition of retirement security adopted in this Article, replacement of
100% of final preretirement wages, adjusted for inflation, for all earners
O See SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., EMERGING
OPTIONS FOR WORK AND RETIREMENT POLICY 3-4 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter
EMERGING OPTIONS] (noting inadequacy of retirement income, suggesting that lost
wages are a basic cause of that inadequacy, and concluding that "there is no guarantee
that current programs left unchanged will ever yield a reasonable earnings-replacement
rate in retirement"); COMING OF AGE, supra note 3, at 11 ("Today, retirement is
thought of as the transition from full-time employment to full-time leisure.").
7 See EMERGING OPTIONS, supra note 6, at 3-4 (noting problem of poverty
among the elderly).
8 See COMING OF AGE, supra note 3, at 49 ("[I]ndividuals should be able to
maintain their preretirement standard of living during retirement years. Retirees
should not have to experience a sudden drop in their standard of living.").
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would satisfy national retirement security policy.9
This formulation of retirement security policy, that is, to provide a
postretirement threshold income to all retirees and to maintain prere-
tirement lifestyles, at least of moderate income workers, serves to clarify
the proper spheres of public subsidies and private savings. Factors such
as retirees' incapacity to respond to income losses by working harder,
the special health and mortality uncertainties of retirement, the general
inabilities of persons to assess adequately such risks during their young
or middle years and, perhaps, a special or increased risk aversion of
elderly persons, suggest that, although low- and moderate-income em-
ployees deserve the greatest public policy attention, some public role in
encouraging retirement savings is warranted for all workers.10 The
risks of advanced age may serve to eliminate confidence about the con-
tinuing adequacy of even a substantial income level. Nonetheless, it
seems clear that the public role should decline in importance as an indi-
vidual's wealth increases and that, at some point, reliance on individual
and familial savings should dominate. Presumably, wealthier retirees
will own investment assets that will produce adequate investment in-
come for consumption during retirement.
By the definition adopted in this Article, retirement security public
policy goals are limited generally to replacing income lost through re-
tirement, but even a 100% wage replacement program would not satisfy
other national concerns. I ignore, for example, the general problems of
poverty as well as the important need to provide health insurance, a
particular need of the elderly."'
B. The Tripartite System of Programs
Delineating the retirement security goal as a wage-replacement
s This Article therefore defines retirement security policy fairly narrowly, as the
replacement of lost wages due to retirement. Once 100% of these wages are replaced,
retirement security, under this definition, is achieved. Issues that arise when the re-
placement of all of one's preretirement wages results in postretirement income that is
below what is thought to be an adequate level of income are considered to be matters of
poverty policy generally. While these concerns cannot be ignored, they are treated here
as distinct from questions of retirement security.
'0 See Halperin, Tax Policy and Retirement Income: A Rational Model for the
21st Century, in SEARCH FOR A NATIONAL RETIREMENT SECURTY POLICY 159, 161
(J. VanDerhei ed. 1987); Thompson, The Social Security Reform Debate, 21 J. EcoN.
LITERATURE 1425, 1440-41 (1983).
" See supra note 9. Although antipoverty and health insurance programs might
well be influenced by the inability of retirees to return to the labor force and are some-
times regarded both here and in other countries as an integral part of retirement secur-
ity policy, this Article treats the antipoverty and health insurance issues as separate
national problems and therefore does not discuss them.
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goal helps to clarify the suitable functions of the various elements of
our tripartite retirement security system. Social Security-a completely
public program-might serve fully to meet the basic income adequacy
goal for poorer workers, contribute substantially toward ensuring an
adequate threshold retirement income for moderate income workers,
and assist somewhat in postretirement lifestyle maintenance for all
workers.1" This vision of a public Social Security function would re-
quire at least all individuals who have enough earnings to satisfy cur-
rent basic needs to substitute future for current consumption, for exam-
ple by taxing current wages in exchange for subsequent wage-
replacement retirement benefits. In addition, such a view regards as
appropriate the redistributional aspects of Social Security and dismisses
the contention that a public social security program should resemble an
actuarially sound retirement insurance plan for all workers, even those
at the highest income levels.18 The dominant public role of retirement
income security policy should be to ensure post-retirement income ade-
quacy for low- and moderate-income workers.
At the other end of the income scale, private individual savings are
most likely to ensure retirement income security for those workers who
have earned sufficiently high lifetime wages (or who otherwise have
sufficient investment assets) to enable them to use current savings to
protect themselves from a substantial decline in living standard upon
retirement. 4 The public role in this context should obviously permit,
and perhaps facilitate, private savings for retirement, but the individual
savings component of retirement security for higher income workers
should be a primarily private matter. Once basic income adequacy dur-
ing retirement is assured, the government might well remain generally
neutral about individual decisions by high-income workers regarding
"2 The President's Commission on Pension Policy has noted:
The [Social Security] program combines the goals of individual equity and
social adequacy. On the one hand, there is a relationship between the
earnings on which an individual pays social security taxes and what he or
she receives in cash benefits. On the other hand, the program is partly
redistributive, targeting benefits to those most in need.
COMING OF AGE, supra note 3, at 49.
11 See Simon, Rights and Redistribution in the Welfare System, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 1441, 1455-59 (1986) (examining the attenuation of the insurance analogy in the
development of the social security program).
14 See COMING OF AGE, supra note 3, at 45 ("[DJue to income levels and the tax
structure, higher income individuals are more likely to utilize a voluntary tax deferral
program than are lower income people."); cf. Boskin, Kotlikoff, Puffert, & Shoven,
supra note 2, at 26-27 (demonstrating that high-income earners receive a lower inter-
nal rate of return on social security taxes paid than that received by low-income earners
within the same generation). For a detailed discussion of individual savings for retire-
ment, see infra notes 169-209 and accompanying text.
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the tradeoff between their own current and future consumption, except
to the extent that this tradeoff may affect the tendency of employers to
create and maintain pension plans that will benefit low- and moderate-
income workers as well.
The appropriate role of the social security and individual savings
elements of the tripartite retirement security program thus fits easily
within this Article's articulation of retirement security goals. Private
pensions present more of a problem. While it is clear that these em-
ployer-provided pensions often contribute to basic income adequacy, es-
pecially for low- and moderate-income workers, it is not nearly so clear
to what extent employer-provided plans should serve to facilitate
postretirement lifestyle maintenance for all workers.15 Specification of
the appropriate role for employer-sponsored pension plans depends
both on the overall ambitions of the national retirement security pro-
gram and on the adequacy of social security. The voluntariness of such
plans links them to individual savings, while their collective nature
with respect to benefits and risks as well as with respect to employer
and regulatory limitations on employee choices, suggests a public na-
ture. Dominant reliance on income tax incentives as the public stimulus
for employer plans necessarily confounds retirement security and in-
come tax policies.
As this Article will develop further, the necessary function of em-
ployer-provided pension plans in bridging the public antipoverty/basic
income adequacy function of Social Security and the private lifestyle
maintenance function of individual savings creates substantial tensions
in the formulation of public policy regarding such plans. Typically, the
tensions are manifested by debates over the appropriate conditions that
must be met by private pensions in order to qualify for income tax
benefits"' and over the propriety and effects of extending similar bene-
fits to private individual retirement savings plans. 17 Viewing employer
pensions as an integral part of a coherent national retirement security
policy, however, also requires coordinating the significant features of
employer plans with the distribution of the benefits and burdens of
both Social Security and the public aspects of individual savings. Ulti-
mately, this raises questions about the ability of voluntary employer
15 See A. MUNNELL, supra note 4, at 25-28 (questioning the role of private pen-
sions in bridging the gap between pre- and postretirement income)."6 See, e.g., J. ROSENBLOOM & G. HALLMAN, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANNING
268-71 (1981) (discussing eligibility of retirement plans for preferential tax treatment
under ERISA); N. Altman Lupu, supra note 2, at 60-70 (criticizing as inadequate,
from a retirement security policy standpoint, the 1986 Tax Reform Act's conditions on
eligibility of pensions for favored tax treatment).
17 See infra notes 171-98 and accompanying text.
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plans to fulfill their critical function in national retirement security
policy.
C. The Critical Role of Federal Tax Policy
Because they implement this nation's retirement security policy,
federal tax provisions and policies serve as a common mechanism influ-
encing all three means of financing retirement security. The dominant
role of the payroll tax as the implementation mechanism for funding
Social Security is obvious and has been the subject of considerable ex-
pert and public attention. 8 The public, however, has paid far less at-
tention to the dramatic effect that federal tax rules have on employer-
provided pensions and on individual savings. The income "tax expendi-
ture" provisions for qualified employer-provided pension plans19 and
for individual savings, principally through "individual retirement ac-
counts"20 are the most important of these rules. The income tax advan-
tages for savings in other forms, such as home ownership and life in-
surance policies,21 also have an effect. Relationships among all of these
"8 See, e.g., A. Munnell, supra note 2, at 2; J. Tobin, supra note 2, at 3; see also
Tax Burdens of Low-Income Wage Earners: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Select
Revenue Measures of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 23-
77 (1985) [hereinafter Tax Burdens] (testimony on the inequities of the tax system,
including the payroll tax); Taxes, Social Security and the Deficit: Hearing Before the
House Select Comm. on Aging, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 53-82 (1985) [hereinafter Taxes
Hearing] (testimony on the inequitable burden the payroll Social Security tax places on
low-income wage earners). See generally Thompson, supra note 10, at 1426-30 (basic
description of framework of social security benefit programs).
19 See I.R.C. § 401(a) (1982 & Supp. 1111985 & West Supp. 1987: Tax Reform
Act of 1986 Special Pamphlet [hereinafter West Supp. 1987]), § 402(a)(1) (1982); see
also N. Altman Lupu, supra note 2, at 2 n.4 ("In 1986, approximately $79 billion was
excluded from annual income tax liability as a consequence of pension contributions to
and earnings under employer-sponsored pension arrangements."). See generally
Halperin, supra note 10 (discussing possible restructuring of tax incentives for em-
ployer-sponsored pension plans). For a compilation of recent statistics on the impact of
the tax expenditure provisions, see STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 100TH
CONG., 2D SESS., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS
1988-1992 (Joint Comm. Print 1987) [hereinafter JT. COMM. ESTIMATES].
20 See I.R.C. § 408 (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987); see also EM-
PLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, ISSUE BRIEF No. 52, RETIREMENT INCOME
AND INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT AccouNis 1 (1986) [hereinafter EBRI, IRAs] ("The
Department of the Treasury estimates the federal revenue loss associated with the IRA
tax deduction at $12.7 billion in 1985.").
"1 See SENATE COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 99TH CONG., 2D SEss., TAX EXPENDI-
TURES: RELATIONSHIPS TO SPENDING PROGRAMS AND BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON
INDIVIDUAL PROVISIONS 121, 155-63 (Comm. Print 1986) [hereinafter TAX EXPENDI-
TURES] (providing estimated revenue losses from tax-favored treatment for home own-
ers and life insurance policies); see also JT. COMM. ESTIMATES, supra note 19, at 10-
17 table 1. See generally Merrill, Home Equity and the Elderly, in RETIREMENT AND
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 197 (H. Aaron & G. Burtless eds. 1984) (examining the role of
home equity as an alternative source of retirement income).
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tax provisions have been largely ignored.
A unified approach to retirement security policy thus requires re-
jection of traditional analyses that test the efficiency or equity of these
provisions by reference to the internal norms of either the income tax or
the social security system.22 In other words, to look to the impact upon
the income tax system of only the retirement security tax provisions is
inadequate, as is regarding the social security retirement system as if it
were a closed and complete social insurance scheme. In some cases, the
law itself has made explicit certain relationships between the income
tax and social security provisions. For example, the income tax nondis-
crimination requirements for employer-provided pension plans have
long contained so-called "integration" rules that, in effect, have treated
social security benefits as if they were provided by the employer and
allowed pension plans to qualify for favorable income tax treatment
even if they were restricted so as to be only supplemental to social se-
curity benefits .2  Recent legislation has included important new provi-
sions that explicitly link the social security tax and the income tax. The
most important of these are the 1975 enactment and 1986 expansion of
an "earned income tax credit,"'24 which provides income tax refunds to
low-income families as a partial offset to their social security tax bur-
dens, and the inclusion under the 1983 Social Security Tax Amend-
ments of a portion of social security benefits in taxable income.
25
22 See generally A. MUNNELL, supra note 4 (private pensions); Simon, supra
note 13, at 1448-77 (social security).
13 See I.R.C. § 401(a)(5) (West Supp. 1987). For the argument that pre-1986
integration practices allowed pension plans to discriminate in favor of highly paid em-
ployees, see Wolk, Discrimination Rules for Qualified Retirement Plans: Good Inten-
tions Confront Economic Reality, 70 VA. L. REV. 419, 445-49 (1984). The impact of
integration on the question of who receives pension plan benefits varies with the extent
to which integration is practiced across different types of plans and the type of integra-
tion method and benefits/earnings levels used. See Halperin, supra note 10, at 168-71;
N. Altman Lupu, supra note 2, at 61. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see
infra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
"' The 1975 Earned Income Tax Credit ("EITC") legislation applied to families
earning a maximum of $11,000 with at least one child. The maximum tax credit al-
lowed was $550. See Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 204(a), 89
Stat. 26, 30 (current version at I.R.C. § 32 (Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987)).
Under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the maximum earnings allowed are raised to
$17,000, see I.R.C. § 32(b) (West Supp. 1987), and the maximum credit is raised to
$800, see I.R.C. § 32(a), (b) (West Supp. 1987). Additionally, the phase-out income
range is adjusted for inflation. See I.R.C. § 32(i) (West Supp. 1987). For a discussion
of the EITC and its effect on low- and moderate-income earners, see Steuerle & Wil-
son, The Taxation of Poor and Lower-Income Workers, 34 TAX NOTES 695, 702-05
(1987).
25 See Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 121(a), 97 Stat.
65, 80-81 (1983) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 86 (Supp. III 1985 & West Supp.
1987)). See generally Taxes Hearing, supra note 18 (testimony criticizing the increase
in taxes on social security benefits). These provisions operate in a manner that, in
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The use of the tax system to implement retirement security policy
not only raises questions about the efficacy and fairness of tax law as
the dominant method of implementation but also requires an evaluation
of how using the tax code to facilitate the provision of retirement in-
come security interacts with overall national tax policies. Both the so-
cial security tax provisions and the income tax provisions recently have
been subject to significant revisions. The 1983 Social Security Amend-
ments apparently have put that program on a sound financial footing
for many years to come,2" and the massive 1986 Tax Reform Act con-
tains substantial revisions to the income tax rules governing both pri-
vate employer-provided pensions and individual retirement savings,27
changes that are intended to make these provisions more responsive to
national retirement security concerns. These recent re-examinations of
social security financing and income tax policies toward retirement sav-
ings make this an auspicious time-one almost uniquely free from a
crisis atmosphere-for reviewing federal tax policies designed to facili-
tate retirement income security for the populace.
D. The Relationship of Tax Equity and Retirement Security
Concerns
Tax equity requires that tax burdens be correlated with people's
ability to pay. Persons with equal ability to pay taxes should pay equal
-taxes, and persons with greater ability should pay greater taxes.28 The
ability-to-pay criterion enjoys broad acceptance as a fundamental tenet
of tax justice, although the details of its implementation are controver-
sial. For example, user charges are typically regarded as properly ex-
empted from the ability-to-pay requirement, and disputes often arise
over issues such as whether the ability-to-pay criterion should be ap-
present value terms, under reasonable assumptions, parallels the income tax treatment
of qualified employer-provided pension plans.
26 See BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL OLD-AGE SURVIVORS INSURANCE
AND DISABILITY INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS, 1985 ANNUAL REPORT, H.R. Doc. No.
99, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 62-63, 73-74 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 ANNUAL REPORT]; A.
Munnell, supra note 2, at 8-12. See generally Ballantyne, Actuarial Status of the
OASI and DI Trust Funds, Soc. SEC. BULL., June 1985, at 27 (summarizing the
current financial and actuarial status of old-age, survivors, and disability insurance
("OASDI") programs as shown in 1985 ANNUAL REPORT.)
27 See, e.g., Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, §§ 1101 (limitations
on IRA deductions), 1111-1120 (enhanced nondiscrimination rules), 1121-1124 (taxa-
tion of accumulations in qualified pension plans), 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS (100 Stat.) - (to be codified in scattered sections of I.R.C.). For a good general
discussion of these provisions, see N. Altman" Lupu, supra note 2, at 30-82.
28 See M. GRAETZ, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 15
(successor ed. 1985).
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plied on an individual or family basis, 29 whether it requires progressiv-
ity or only proportionality in the distribution of tax burdens,30 and
whether it should be applied independently to each significant tax im-
posed or to the tax system as a whole.3" One need not reach the contro-
versial boundaries, however, to conclude that the tax provisions imple-
menting our national retirement security goals not only fail to satisfy an
ability-to-pay criterion but also present a serious threat to this basic
principle of tax justice.
A demonstration of this important point requires scrutiny of three
related issues. We must first ask whether the tax provisions implement-
ing national retirement security policy, viewed as a coherent whole, sat-
isfy the fundamental principle of tax equity. If not, we must inquire
whether there are compensating features of the tax system that redress
the failures internal to the retirement security provisions, thereby as-
suring that the ability-to-pay criterion is satisfied as a matter of general
tax policy. If no comfort is found either in the retirement security tax
provisions or in overall tax policy, we must then ascertain whether the
distribution of federal retirement security benefits sufficiently offsets
failures revealed on the tax side.
The enormous growth of the payroll tax to finance social welfare
programs and, especially, to finance the retirement component of social
security, is surely the most significant development in the federal tax
structure in the past thirty years. In 1954, these taxes accounted for
10% of budget receipts, but by 1984, payroll taxes had risen to a total
of $241 billion dollars, or 36% of 1984 federal revenues. 2 Total payroll
tax rates have risen from 8.8% in 1967 to the current 14.3%.33
Simultaneously with this great tax increase on labor income, we
have experienced an almost equally striking decline in taxes on capital,
most dramatically in the portion of federal revenues generated by the
29 See id. at 456-75.
30 See id. at 21-27.
1 See id. at 18-21.
'2 See Federal Tax Treatment of Low Income Persons: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 11
(1984) [hereinafter Tax Treatment] (statement of Charles McLure, Dep. Ass't Sec. for
Tax Analysis, Dept. of Treasury) (estimated 1985 statistics); see also CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE, A REPORT TO THE SENATE AND HOUSE COMMS. ON THE BUDGET,
THE ECONOMIC AND BUDGET OUTLOOK: AN UPDATE 55 (1986) (projection that so-
cial insurance revenue will be approximately 36% of GNP in 1984-1989).
Is See I.R.C. § 3101(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985), (b) (1982); J. Tobin, supra
note 2, at 25. "The growing importance of the payroll tax in the federal tax structure
has been a major factor in reducing the progressivity of the system, especially over the
lower end of the income scale and for the working-age population." Musgrave, supra
note 2, at 110. See generally J. PECHMAN, WHO PAID THE TAXES 1966-85? (1985)
(discussing distribution of tax burdens by income class).
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corporate income tax. These taxes accounted for 28.4% of federal reve-
nues in 1953. By 1983, they accounted for only 6.6%."' The individual
income tax, by contrast, has been a relatively steady source of federal
revenues, producing 45.2% of the total in 1953 and 47.2% in 1983."
This shift in federal tax sources over time-payroll taxes increas-
ing greatly while corporate income taxes declined significantly-has af-
fected significantly the allocation of the federal tax burden between
taxes on capital and taxes on labor. In 1986, the tax rate on labor
income was estimated to be nearly double that on capital income."6
Other estimates suggest a total average tax rate on income from capital
of about 13.7%,37 a rate not substantially greater than the 12.4% rate in
combined income and FICA taxes paid in 1986 by individuals who
earn one-half of median income.38
If the basic principle of tax justice requiring taxes to be distributed
34 See M. GRAETZ, supra note 28, at 5. Calculations of the declining proportion
of federal revenue contributed by the corporate income tax vary, but all point to a
substantial decline. "Previous to 1950, corporations were paying 40 percent of the tax
in this Nation." Tax Burdens, supra note 18, at 7 (statement of Speaker O'Neill). "In
1954, corporations were paying 30.3 percent, and now they are paying 8.5 percent
. " Id. See also Auerbach, The Corporation Income Tax, in THE PROMISE OF
TAX REFORM 59, 59-61 (J. Pechman ed. 1985).
The 1982 legislation increased the percentage of federal revenues generated by the
corporate income tax to about 10% in 1984. Critics argue, however, that the combined
effect of the 1981 and 1982 tax acts regarding the amount of corporate taxes paid will
result in "a reduction in the corporate tax revenues by about 22 percent to 25 percent
between 1984 and 1988." E. STEUERLE, TAXEs, LOANS, AND INFLATION 33 (1985).
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 is intended to increase somewhat the contribution to
federal revenues of the corporate income tax. See 2 TAx REFORM ACr OF 1986, H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 264 (1986) [hereinafter CONF. REP.].
35 See M. GRAETZ, supra note 28, at 5. The share of federal revenues from in-
come tax has been steady, ranging between 42% and 48% of revenues.
a These rates were estimated at 19% and 11% respectively. See J. PECHMAN,
supra note 33, at 73 table 5-5 (assuming the least progressive set of incidence assump-
tions). Viewed differently, capital income is not taxed as completely as labor income.
"[A]pproximately 40 percent of all capital will earn tax-exempt income." Ballentine,
Broadening Our Approach to Income Tax Reform, 5 AM. J. TAx POL'Y 1, 2 (1986).
37 See Ballentine, supra note 36, at 3 (relying on 1982 figures based on an effec-
tive tax rate of about 23% on income from business capital and essentially zero on
income from nonbusiness capital). Dividing tax revenues on net capital income by the
amount of net capital income in the economy yields an effective income tax rate as low
as 7.5% on all capital income. See E. STEUERLE, supra note 34, at 13. This disparity,
coupled with the income tax treatment of borrowing, leads to tax arbitrage opportuni-
ties. See infra notes 204-09 and accompanying text.
" This figure does not take into account the employer's share of FICA taxes paid
on the employees' behalf, even though these taxes are almost certainly also borne by the
employees. Additionally, combined federal income and FICA taxes total 10.8% of in-
come for those families at the poverty level in 1983. See Tax Treatment, supra note 32,
at 30 (statement of Charles McLure). Some critics argue that "the combined marginal
income and payroll tax rate for a family of* four earning $12,000 a year is actually
higher than tax rates . . . on profits from capital gains. . . ." Id. at 56 (statement of
Robert Greenstein, Dir., Center on Budget and Policy Priorities).
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in accordance with ability to pay is to be satisfied, a significant portion
of the tax burden must be borne either by wealth (or wealth transfers)
or income from capital. Taxes on labor income alone-even if, unlike
FICA taxes, they were progressively structured-do not produce taxa-
tion based upon ability to pay, for those with the greatest ability to pay
often have channelled their monies into capital."9 Thus, although taxes
on wages may be appropriate as a primary mechanism for ensuring
low- and moderate-income workers an adequate postretirement income,
the massive increase during recent decades in the relative tax burden on
labor is cause for concern.40 Regardless of whether the overall alloca-
tion of federal taxes between labor and capital is considered to meet
minimal standards of tax fairness, this brief overview suggests that if
the retirement security provisions themselves do not satisfy the basic
ability-to-pay criterion, there is little reason to believe that difficulties
internal to these provisions will be compensated for by the federal tax
system as a whole. We must therefore examine the particular tax pro-
visions affecting the three components of the unified retirement security
policy in an effort to judge whether these provisions, viewed as a coher-
ent whole, satisfy the fundamental ability to pay principle of tax jus-
tice. The payroll tax is the appropriate place to begin.
II. INEQUITIES WITHIN THE PAYROLL TAX
While the social security tax rate is a proportional one,41 the social
security tax burden is regressive.42 The fundamental problems in the
imposition of payroll taxes to finance Social Security occur at the bot-
39 See Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259, 270
(1983).
40 "In 1966 the tax burden on capital income was substantially higher than the
burden on labor income. This pattern was reversed by 1985 as a result of the reduced
roles of the corporation income tax and the property tax and the greater role of the
payroll tax." J. PECHMAN, supra note 33, at 8-9. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 may
well produce some increase in the share of taxes borne by capital income, principally
through increases in corporate income tax and, in any event, reflects a significant effort
by Congress to restrict widespread individual and corporate income tax opportunities
for avoiding taxes on capital income. See generally 2 CONF. REP., supra note 34, at
158-249, 264-84 (detailing changes in corporate taxation), 137-50 (detailing limitations
on losses and credits from passive activities).
It seems unlikely that the revision of the overall shares of taxes borne by labor and
capital through the 1986 Tax Reform Act will have a substantial impact on the ever-
increasing tax burden on labor income. See Tax Burdens, supra note 18, at 52 (state-
ment of Prof. Harold Hochman). This prophecy is supported by the existence of prior
amendments to the Social Security Act that will continue to increase payroll taxes in
the future.
41 See I.R.C. § 3101(a) (Supp. III 1985).
42 See J. PECHMAN, supra note 33, at 55-56 & table 4-9; Steuerle & Wilson,
supra note 24, at 700.
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tom and top ends of the tax schedule. The payroll tax provides no ex-
emption level or floor on wages below which the tax is not imposed,
but it does contain a maximum level or ceiling on wages subject to
tax.
43
A. The Payroll Tax Burden on the Working Poor
Historically, the most significant inequity in the social security tax
has been its imposition of a substantial tax burden on the working
poor.44 This burden has become of greater import as increasing num-
bers of poor individuals and families are receiving a larger share of
their income from earnings-the percentage of total income from earn-
ings of families at the poverty level increased from 28% in 1974 to 40%
in 1981 .4 5 Unlike most tax systems, such as the income tax, the first
dollar of wages is subject to social security tax. Thus, in 1981, 42% of
all households below the poverty level paid social security payroll
taxes.46 As a result, for a family of four at the poverty level in 1984,
payroll taxes equalled $711, nearly double the income tax burden of
$365.47 The 1986 removal of six million poverty-level families from the
income tax rolls will not stem these trends; it leaves the payroll tax as
the only substantial federal tax imposed on the working poor.48
4S See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
4' See Tax Treatment, supra note 32, at 11 (statement of Charles McLure); see
also Steuerle & Wilson, supra note 24, at 707 ("The most significant increase in direct
taxes for poor and lower-income workers . . . has been not the income tax, but the
Social Security tax .. . Currently, many lower-income workers are making substan-
tial transfers to middle-income retirees whose contributions into the system were at
much lower rates of taxation."). See generally Work and Poverty: The Special
Problems of the Working Poor: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Employment and
Housing of the House Comm. on Govt. Operations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 21-22 table 5
(1985) (statement of Professors Sheldon Danziger and Peter Gottschalk) [hereinafter
Working Poor] (noting the steady increase in social security taxes from 1965 to 1984).
45 See Tax Treatment, supra note 32, at 35 (statement of John F. Coder, Income
Statistics Branch Chief, Bureau of Census).
46 Payroll taxes are a significant tax burden for the working poor. "Although
persons with incomes near the poverty line generally pay little in Federal income taxes,
6.7 percent of their earnings go for payroll taxes." Census and Designation of Poverty
and Income: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Census and Population of the
House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service and the Subcomm. on Oversight of the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1984) [hereinafter Cen-
sus] (statement of Eric Hanushek, Dep. Dir., Congressional Budget Office).
47 See Tax Treatment, supra note 32, at 11 (statement of Charles McLure). If
payroll and income taxes are considered, the 1980 national poverty rate increases from
13.3% to 14.1%. See Census, supra note 46, at 23 (statement of Louis Kincannon, Dep.
Dir., Bureau of Census). In 1982, 3.2 million persons in families who had gross in-
comes above the poverty line were pushed below the poverty line due to their income
and payroll tax obligations. See Tax Burdens, supra note 18, at 69 (statement of Rob-
ert Greenstein).
48 See 2 CONF. REP., supra note 34, at 2-9 (summarizing changes in tax rates and
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Beginning in 1975, Congress recognized these fundamental inequi-
ties and enacted an Earned Income Tax Credit ("EITC") into the in-
come tax to reduce the burden on poor families with dependent chil-
dren.4" In addition, the 1986 legislation increased the EITC maximum
earnings level and introduced indexing of the credit for inflation.50 To
the extent that the earned income credit exceeds the income tax liability
of poor families, it, in effect, serves as a reduction in the social security
tax burden of those families. 1 Even after its latest expansion, however,
this indirect relief from the social security tax burden of the working
poor remains an inadequate substitute for a minimum income level for
exemption from the social security tax burden. For example, the earned
income tax credit is available to only a limited portion of the working
poor, namely, families with dependent children.5 2 Moreover, if experi-
ence with the prior mechanism to relieve income taxes as an offset to
social security taxes-the retirement income credit 5'-is any guide, the
earned income tax credit seems likely not to be claimed by a substantial
rate structure of the Tax Reform Act of 1986); Working Poor, supra note 44, at 21-22
table 5 (statement of Professors Sheldon Danziger and Peter Gottschalk).
" See Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 204(a), 89 Stat. 26, 30
(current version at I.R.C. § 32 (Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987)); see also Steuerle
& Wilson, supra note 24, at 702 (discussing effect of 1986 Tax Reform Act on the
EITG and noting likely consequences of the amendment).
50 See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 111(a), (b) (increasing
maximum earning level), (c) (indexing for inflation), 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) - (to be codified at I.R.C. § 32(a), (b) and § 32(c),
respectively).
51 "The EITC largely eliminates the burden of Social Security taxes for many
low-income workers. Since the credit is refundable, it offsets more than income tax
liability for some households." Steuerle & Wilson, supra note 24, at 704.
52 See I.R.C. § 32(c) (Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987). The EITC has been
criticized in other respects as well. Steuerle and Wilson argue:
[T]he EITC has several problems. Eligibility for the EITC does not de-
pend on a recipient's assets and other criteria common to welfare pro-
grams. Eligibility also is unaffected by the receipt of nontaxable income.
Thus, some recipients of the credit are millionaires with large amounts of
tax shelter income. The credit also may go to those with significant
amounts of income excluded from income taxation, such as workers' com-
pensation. Thus, although the tax system has advantages as a means for
promoting welfare policy goals-it is simple and can easily identify par-
ticipants based upon tax data that is already filed-one major disadvan-
tage is that not all relevant information is reported on tax forms. More-
over, the definition of a household for tax purposes may differ from that
which is most appropriate for a welfare program. The latter, for instance,
may count several tax units as a single household for welfare purposes.
Steuerle & Wilson, supra note 24, at 702-03.
11 See I.R.C. § 22 (Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987). For a discussion of the
retirement income credit, see E. GRISWOLD & M. GRAETZ, FEDERAL INCOME TAXA-
TION PRINCIPLES AND PouiiEs 463-65 (successor ed. 1976).
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number of the families entitled to it." Finally, there is a temptation to
double count the tax benefits of the earned income tax credit; it is
sometimes credited with helping to remove poverty level families from
the income tax rolls at the same time as it is described as relieving
payroll tax burdens of the working poor. Thus, the 1986 legislation is
no remedy to the unfairness of subjecting poor working families to a
significant social security tax burden.
Economists generally agree that both the employers' and the em-
ployees' shares of social security taxes are borne by employees in the
form of reduced wages.55 The current combined payroll tax rate of
11.4%5" is a substantial, unjustifiable burden on low income workers.
In recent years, the combined marginal income and payroll tax rate on
a family of four earning $12,000 a year has been greater than the tax
rate paid by wealthy investors on profits from capital gains. 57 While
the 1986 income tax legislation may well reverse this particular rela-
tionship, it fails to address directly the basic problem of the sizeable tax
burden of payroll taxes on the working poor.
The burden of social security taxes on the working poor is exacer-
bated by the income tax treatment of the social security tax. For those
low- and moderate-income workers who are subject to the income tax,
the inclusion of the social security tax in current wages58 and the corre-
sponding subjection of that tax to current income taxation, while
Employers who are unaware of or who do not want to be bothered with com-
puting the credit may, intentionally or unintentionally, fail to deduct the income from
the employee's withholding. The employee must then claim the credit on her tax return
or wait for the IRS to discover the omission. Moreover, workers who do not need to file
an income tax return may "fall through the cracks" by not filing to claim a refund. See
Tax Treatment, supra note 32, at 68 (statement of Dr. Joseph J. Minarik, Urban
Institute); see also Tax Burdens, supra note 18, at 43 (statement of Prof. Alvin Schorr)
(persons who do not owe taxes are entitled to refunds if eligible for the EITC); cf. Tax
Treatment, supra note 32, at 30 (statement of Charles McLure) (estimating that the
number of nonfilers eligible for the EITC, although uncertain, is probably fewer than
one million and noting that the I.R.S. encourages nonfilers eligible for the EITC to
file).
" See Steuerle & Wilson, supra note 24, at 700-01 ("It is generally assumed that
both the employee and employer portions of the Social Security tax are borne by the
employee."); Thompson, supra note 10, at 1453 (noting that both shares are "actually
born [sic] by the employee in the form of lower real wages"); see also J. PECHMAN,
supra note 33, at 23-37; Break, The Economic Effects of the OASDI Program, in So-
CIAL SECURITY FINANCING, supra note 2, at 45, 49 (citing studies). But see Brown-
ing, Tax Incidence, Indirect Taxes, and Transfers, 38 NAT'L TAX J. 525, 532 (1985)
(arguing that the "social security payroll tax cannot fall exclusively on labor income").
" See I.R.C. §§ 3101(a) (rate on employees), 3111(a) (rate on employers) (1982
& Supp. III 1985). It should be noted that, with Medicare, the total tax rate rises to
14.3%. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
5 See Tax Treatment, supra note 32, at 56 (statement of Robert Greenstein);
accord Tax Burdens, supra note 18, at 68.
88 See I.R.C. § 3121(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987).
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equivalent in present value terms (so long as tax rates remain constant)
to the treatment of private pensions, requires further deferral of current
consumption."9
The substantial payroll tax burden on the working poor violates
principles of tax justice and cannot be defended either by reference to
ultimate benefits that the working poor may expect to receive from so-
cial security during their retirement or by the public nature of the so-
cial security program. The goal of providing a basic income level to
poor workers after their retirement is simply no justification for
mandatory social security provisions that require poor workers to shift
consumption from the present to the future. At a minimum, poor work-
ers should be exempted from paying social security taxes after they
have participated in the payroll tax system for a sufficient number of
quarters to qualify for payment of minimum benefits.
B. The Payroll Tax Wage Ceiling and the Exclusion of Fringe
Benefits
The regressivity of the social security tax also occurs because of
the declining effective rate of tax that results from the ceiling on wages
subject to the payroll tax. Under current law, all wages over $43,800
are exempt from payroll taxes.60 In addition, significant fringe benefits
are exempted, and these may accrue disproportionately to higher wage
earners. Each of these problems demands solution.
Nontaxable fringe benefits as a percentage of employee compensa-
tion subject to the payroll tax were estimated to amount to about 8% in
1960 and 16% in 1984. The Social Security Trustees' Report estimates
that by the year 2060 fringe benefits will comprise more than one-third
of total compensation.61 While this estimation is merely an extrapola-
tion from the past and thus may not be reliable, it does not seem unrea-
sonable. While nontaxable fringe benefits have amounted to approxi-
59 See M. GRAETZ, supra note 28, at 342-46 (discussing timing issues); Graetz,
Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1575, 1597-1623
(1979) (extensively discussing timing issues, particularly with respect to investments,
consumer durables, and housing). See generally Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Taxing
the "Time Value of Money," 95 YALE L.J. 506 (1986) (discussing taxation problems
caused by timing of realization of investment income); Warren, The Timing of Taxes,
39 NAT'L TAX J. 499 (discussing conditions under which deferral or acceleration will
not affect present value).
60 See 42 U.S.C. § 430(b) (1982); 50 Fed. Reg. 45,558, 45,559 (1985).
61 See Distribution and Economics of Employer-Provided Fringe Benefits: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Social Security and the Subcomm. on Select Revenue
Measures of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1985)
[hereinafter Distribution] (statement of C. Ballantyne, Chief Actuary, Social Security
Administration).
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mately 16% of compensation subject to the payroll tax, the percentage
is substantially higher in relation to total compensation. For example,
the Chamber of Commerce estimated that in 1981 fringe benefits
amounted to 37% of total wages.0 2 The percentage is lower in discus-
sions of social security because of the interaction of the fringe benefit
estimates and the wage ceiling on the payroll tax. Since fringe benefits,
particularly pension benefits, tend to rise as a proportion of wages as
wages rise, there is substantial interaction between the exclusion of
fringe benefits and the existence of the wage ceiling. Obviously, the
inclusion of fringe benefits in the payroll tax base would be of greater
importance if the wage ceiling were repealed. Even under current law,
however, the shift from cash compensation to fringe benefits narrows
the social security wage base and requires a higher tax rate to produce
identical revenues.
3
A significant gain in tax equity would be accomplished by includ-
ing currently excluded fringe benefits in the social security wage base.
Some gain would occur even if fringe benefits, as a percentage of total
compensation, were distributed relatively equally throughout income
classes because those with high-income would bear a higher burden in
funding the social security wage base. Greater gains would occur if, as
is certainly true for pension benefits, high-income taxpayers had
greater opportunity to obtain compensation in the form of excluded
fringe benefits. 4
Implementing such a proposal would not be difficult technically.
The rules under section 401(k) of the Internal Revenue Code with re-
spect to certain employee benefit plans 5 provide a guide for including
fringe benefit items in the social security wage tax base, even if those
" See M. GRAETZ, supra note 28, at 96 (citation omitted).
63 An official of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston has noted:
1984 payroll tax receipts would have been $25 billion higher if employee
benefits were included in the payroll tax base. Alternatively, the 1984 So-
cial Security payroll tax rate. . . could have been lowered from 5.7 per-
cent each for the employer and employee to 5.2 percent, without any re-
duction in 1984 revenues.
Distribution, supra note 61, at 418 (statement of A. Munnell, Senior Vice Pres. and
Dir. of Research, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston). Exclusion of fringe benefits pro-
duces inequities because fringe benefits are concentrated among higher paid employees,
yet all taxpayers must pay for the tax expenditure. See id. at 424; see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 409 (1982 & Supp. 111 1985 & West Supp. 1987) (defining wages for purposes of
federal old-age, survivors, and disability insurance benefits).
" This point turns, to some extent, on my conclusion that those who claim that
the elimination of the wage ceiling would require a massive increase in maximum ben-
efits misunderstand the role of the social security program in a comprehensive national
retirement security system. See infra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
"' See I.R.C. § 401(k) (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987) (profit-
sharing, stock bonus plans).
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items are excluded from the income tax base. Under present law in-
cluding fringe benefits in the income tax base would automatically in-
clude such benefits in the social security tax base.66
Equity also would be significantly improved by eliminating the
wage ceiling on payroll taxes. Currently only about 6% of workers cov-
ered by social security earn more than the maximum taxable earnings
base.67 As the earnings of these individuals rise, the effective social se-
curity tax rate lessens as a percentage of total wages. Elimination of the
wage ceiling would permit a revenue-neutral reduction of about 2% in
the payroll tax rate,68 or, alternatively, could finance significant tax re-
lief for the working poor without affecting the overall financial stability
of the social security system. Moreover, the elimination of the wage
ceiling, if accompanied either by a rate reduction or an exemption for
the working poor, would not increase the overall burden of the payroll
tax on labor and, therefore, would not further shift the tax burden from
88 See 42 U.S.C. § 409 (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987) (providing
that exclusions from wages under I.R.C. § 3121 (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West
Supp. 1987) (relating to income tax withholding) are not applicable to determinations
of wages subject to social security tax). The Social Security Amendments Act of 1983
subjected § 401(k) plan payments to social security taxes, see Pub. L. No. 98-21,
§ 121(a), 97 Stat. 65, 80 (1983) (codified at I.R.C. § 86 (1982 & Supp. III 1985 &
West Supp. 1987)), while allowing tax-advantaged treatment for income tax purposes,
see id. § 123, 97 Stat. at 87-89 (codified at I.R.C. § 3101 (1982 & Supp. III 1985));
§ 124, 97 Stat. at 89-91 (codified at I.R.C. § 1401 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)); see also
Steuerle & Wilson, supra note 24, at 707-08 (recommending, inter alia, expanding the
social security tax base to include fringe benefits that are presently excluded from
taxation).
67
Social Security Tax Rates, Maximum Taxable Payroll,
Taxable Payroll as a Percent of Total Payroll,
and the Percent of Workers with Earnings
below the Taxable Maximum, in Selected Years 1960-1983
Reported Taxable Percent of
Wages and Workers with
Salaries as a Earnings below
Tax Maximum Percent of Social Security
Rate Taxable Wages Total Wages Taxable
Year (Percent) and Salaries and Salaries Maximum
1960 3.0 $ 4,800 79.9 72.6
1970 4.8 7,800 80.4 74.9
1980 6.1 25,900 90.0 91.5
1981 6.6 29,700 90.4 93.0
1982 6.7 32,400 90.7 93.5
1983 6.7 35,700 91.2 94.5
Source: Tax Reform Proposals-XVII: Employee Benefits: Hearing Before the Senate
Finance Comm., 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 196 table IV.2 (1985) (reprinting chapter 4 of a
study done by Dr. Chollet of EBRI).
See Thompson, supra note 10, at 1426.
" See Taxes Hearing, supra note 18, at 3 (statement of Rep. Roybal).
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capital to labor. The massive cuts in the top income tax rate-from
70% in 1981 to 28% in 1988 8 -and the attendant virtual elimination
in 1986 of a progressive income tax rate structure makes even more
compelling the case for eliminating the regressivity caused by the pay-
roll tax wage ceiling.
Opponents of the elimination of the wage ceiling base their oppo-
sition on the assumption that such a change would require a massive
increase in the maximum social security benefit-at current levels re-
quiring benefits up to $150,000 per year.7 0 The basic contention is that
subjecting the full amount of Lee Iacocca's wages to taxes must be ac-
companied by a dramatic increase in Lee Iacocca's social security re-
tirement benefit.
The notion that elimination of the wage ceiling requires a massive
increase in maximum benefits reflects a fundamental misunderstanding
of the public function of the Social Security program as a part of a
more comprehensive national retirement system.7 To regard the Social
Security system as if it were a self-contained system necessarily linked
to actuarially fair private insurance simply is inconsistent with public
policy decisions governing the overall national package of retirement
security benefits. The retirement benefits of Lee Iacocca and other
highly salaried employees are enhanced by a variety of tax advantages
related not only to employer-sponsored pension plans but also to their
individual retirement savings. 2 To look solely to social security benefits
69 See I.R.G. § I (West Supp. 1987).
70 See, e.g., Taxes Hearing, supra note 18, at 68 (statement of David Keating,
Executive Vice Pres., National Taxpayers Union).
71 Several commentators also demonstrate the ways in which a closed-system view
of social security shields the public components of the pension system from scrutiny.
See, e.g., Halperin, supra note 10, at 161-64; Wolk, supra note 23, at 434-63 (arguing
that "top-heavy" and discrimination rules regarding qualified pension plans fail to pre-
vent employers from subsidizing highly compensated earners without also providing
adequate protection for low income workers); N. Altman Lupu, supra note 2, at 61-63
(expressing concern that social security fiction of payments into individual accounts
often is "misemployed" in order to "justify regressive pension plans").
7' The tax advantages enjoyed by highly paid employees are not limited to retire-
ment incentives. Favorable income tax treatment of capital gains and incentive stock
options accrue to the benefit of employees in a position to exercise incentive stock op-
tions. See I.R.C. § 422A (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987); TAx ExPND-
rruREs, supra note 21, at 163, 187 (deferral of capital gains on home sales, capital
gains at death). While a discussion of the cumulative effects of all tax advantages en-
joyed by highly paid individuals is beyond the scope of this Article, the tax advantages
attached to retirement benefits are analyzed later in this Article. See infra notes 120-45
and accompanying text. For detailed explanation of the tax advantages of specific com-
ponents of retirement plans, see generally Halperin, supra note 10 (contribution limits,
§ 401(k) plans, distributions, withdrawals, and terminations); N. Altman Lupu, supra
note 2 (nondiscrimination, vesting, and integration rules allow a disproportionate per-
centage of benefits to accrue to high income workers).
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as the test of fairness for high earners, including fairness of the payroll
tax wage ceiling, skews analysis-to the great disadvantage of low- and
moderate-income workers. As subsequent sections of this Article detail,
a more comprehensive assessment of the distribution of retirement se-
curity benefits justifies eliminating the payroll tax wage ceiling and ei-
ther lowering the payroll tax rate overall or providing payroll tax relief
targeted for the working poor with, at most, a small increase in the
level of maximum social security benefits.
C. The Payroll Tax-Benefits Linkage
More generally, the distribution of social security benefits does not
justify the injustices of the social security tax. Opponents of changes at
the top and bottom of the payroll tax system typically rely on the distri-
bution of social security benefits as a complete justification for the ineq-
uities of the payroll tax." To be sure, when the benefits of Social Se-
curity are taken into account, Social Security has, for its first fifty years
at least, been a very successful redistributive program. Social security
wealth (the contribution of Social Security to household wealth) is dis-
tributed among different households far more equally than privately
accumulated wealth, and Social Security has reduced the concentration
of total household wealth. Social Security benefits now replace about
41% of the earnings of active workers, about the same percentage as
when the program began, but benefits today extend far more broadly
over the labor force, to about 96% of persons aged 65 or over, as com-
pared to 16% in 1950.74 The redistributive-and therefore, in terms of
7' See, e.g., Taxes Hearing, supra note 18, at 13 (statement of Rep. John Paul
Hammerschmidt).
It is often suggested that Social Security's tax rate is regressive because
wages above $40,000 are not taxed. It is only fair to add that the regres-
sivity of the tax is compensated for by the progressivity of the benefit
formula which is weighted heavily in favor of the low-wage earners.
Id. See also Boskin, Kotlikoff, Puffert & Shoven, supra note 2, at 26-27 (discussing the
disparity between the present value of social security benefits received by low-income
earners and high-income earners within the same generation).
7" For distribution data, see Retirement Income Security in the United States:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Social Security and on Oversight of the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 160, 168 table 3 (1985) [hereinafter
RIS Hearings]; Maxfield & Reno, Distribution of Income Sources of Recent Retirees:
Findings from the New Beneficiary Survey, Soc. SEC. BULL., Jan. 1985, at 7, 8-13;
Program Operations, Soc. SEC. BULL., Sept. 1986, at 3-4; J. Tobin, supra note 2, at
11-13. For social security coverage statistics, see 1 DEVELOPMENTS IN AGING: 1985,
99TH CONG., 2D SEss. 21 (Comm. Print 1986) [hereinafter DEVELOPMENTS]; STAFF
OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 99TH CONG., 1ST SESs., BACKGROUND
MATERIAL & DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE
ON WAYS AND MEANS 50-57 (Comm. Print 1985) [hereinafter WAYS & MEANS
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ability to pay, justice-enhancing-aspects of social security benefits are
not, however, a complete response to the problems of social security tax
injustice. First, to treat Social Security, employer retirement plans, and
individual savings as complementary aspects of a comprehensive na-
tional retirement security program requires a closer look at the distri-
butional aspects of the latter two components of the program and inte-
gration of those findings with the analysis of Social Security. Such a
look will show a far less redistributive, and thus less justice-enhancing,
national retirement security program than emerges from looking at so-
cial security benefits alone. Second, the widespread belief that Social
Security fully replaces the income of low earners is a myth. Actual re-
placement rates for couples in the lowest earning quintile were 56% of
preretirement wages.75 Thus, social security benefits are inadequate to
prevent widespread declines in living standards even of low- and mod-
erate-wage earners upon retirement.
The role of social security benefits in combating the prospects of
widespread poverty among the elderly, a concern that is treated here
generally as separate from retirement security concerns, nevertheless
accounts for a significant element of the redistributive quality of Social
Security. To the extent that we are a nation committed to a national
antipoverty "safety net" for all of our people, some portion of social
security benefits might properly be regarded as attributable to our over-
all system of government transfers to the poor.7 1 Surely, this is the case,
BACKGROUND].
In addition, social security payments play a significant role in fighting poverty
among the elderly. "[Siocial security had the greatest impact upon reducing poverty
other than earnings .... Social security income lifted approximately 9.7 million older
persons out of poverty. Social security reduced the poverty rate among the aged from
51.0 percent to 14.1 percent-a reduction of 72.3 percent." Id. at 88; see also Steuerle
& Wilson, supra note 24, at 700 ("The Social Security program has been enormously
successful in reducing the incidence of poverty among the elderly.").
75 See A. MUNNELL, supra note 4, at 20 table 2-3; cf. Halperin, supra note 10, at
161 n.13 (replacement rates for singles).
76 See Thompson, supra note 10, at 1436. In FY 1985, approximately $8.6 billion
of federally financed supplemental security income ("SSI") payments were made. Of
these payments, $6.3 billion, or 72%, went to those eligible on the basis of a disability;
$2.1 billion, or 26%, went to the aged; and $192 million, or 2%, went to the blind. See
STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 99TH CONG., 2D SESS., BACK-
GROUND MATERIAL & DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE
COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 477 (Comm. Print 1986). Eligibility for SSI pay-
ments is detailed at 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-428 (1982 & Supp. I1 1985 & West Supp.
1987). Even a portion of non-means-tested social security payments can be considered
transfer payments to nonworker beneficiaries who technically have not earned the bene-
fits. Of the total benefits paid from the OASI Trust Fund in 1984, "about 17 percent
represented monthly benefits to aged survivors and disabled widows and widowers of
deceased workers. Approximately 6 percent of the benefit payments [were] on behalf of
children of deceased workers." 1985 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 17.
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for example, whenever total government transfers to the elderly exceed
100% of inflation-adjusted final preretirement wages. To divorce this
goal of social security benefits in general from the wage replacement
goal of retirement security policy not only calls into question the wide-
spread contentions that the benefits structure of social security fully re-
dresses its tax unfairness, but also weakens the case for wage-based
taxation as the mechanism for financing benefits.7
III. EMPLOYER-PROVIDED PENSIONS
As noted above, many oppose the elimination of the payroll tax
wage ceiling on the grounds that such elimination would require that
government-provided retirement benefits for high- wage employees far
exceed the current social security maximum. Surely, the most direct
response to this opposition is that the government already provides such
additional benefits, for example, in the form of tax benefits, labelled in
the federal budget "tax expenditures," for employer-provided pensions.
The public component, both in subsidizing and regulating employer-
provided pensions, makes the common label "private pensions" quite
misleading. Under the income tax, employer-provided pensions may
qualify for special tax treatment; employers' payments into a pension
plan are immediately deductible by employers but are not currently in-
cludable in the income of the employees. In addition, the earnings of
pension funds are not taxed as earned but rather accumulate free of
income tax.78 This income tax treatment is clearly more favorable than
that given to cash compensation, most notably because pension funds
accumulate earnings tax-free in contrast to the normal current income
taxation of investment income, but also because the deferral of taxation
of compensation until retirement may permit taxation at lower rates.7 9
According to recent estimates of tax expenditures, the largest tax
expenditure for individuals by far is the net exclusion for employer-
sponsored pension contributions and earnings. In 1985, for example,
7 For a discussion of the tax-transfer perspective on social security benefits versus
the insurance view, see Thompson, supra note 10, at 1436-37.
718 See Halperin, supra note 10, at 159-60; N. Altman Lupu, supra note 2, at 16-
17. These special tax rules for qualified pension plans result in revenue loss estimated
at $49.3 billion in 1988 and expected to rise to $67.5 billion in 1992. See TAX Ex-
PENDITURS, supra note 21, at 313-14.
79 See Halperin, supra note 10, at 160 n.6. Through revisions of the income tax
rate schedules, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 may reduce the advantages of lowering an
employee's marginal tax rate during retirement. If such rate revision is permanent, the
1986 Act may eliminate or decrease the shifting of income to a lower postretirement
rate. See TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 21, at 314. For the argument that a critical
element of retirement savings involves shifting the rate of tax, see Halperin, supra note
59, at 519-20.
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tax expenditures for employer-provided pensions were estimated to cost
the Treasury nearly $53 billion, more than double the next largest tax
expenditure item, the $25.5 billion lost because of the home mortgage
interest deduction.80 In fiscal 1987 (before the effects of the 1986 Tax
Reform Act are taken into account), the revenue loss attributable to
employer pensions has been estimated at $61.3 billion. 1 The effects of
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (principally the reduction of the tax rate)
are estimated to reduce this amount to $49.3 billion for fiscal 1988, a
number that is expected to grow to $67.5 billion by fiscal 1992.2 Even
if these estimates somewhat overstate the size of the government sub-
sidy, 3 the tax incentive for employer-provided pensions undoubtedly
constitutes an extremely significant aspect of this nation's retirement
security program.
Although there are nontax reasons" for employers to establish
pension plans and, in fact, some employer plans predate the income
tax, tax incentives to employer-provided pensions, at a minimum, have
produced a substantial shift away from other savings.8 5 Private pension
8o See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG. 2D SESS., FSTI-
MATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 1987-1991, at 18 table 3
(Comm. Print 1986); Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 1984-
1989, 25 TAX NOTES 721, 727 table 1 (1984); see also TAX EXPENDrURE, supra
note 21, at 155, 159, 313. For the most recent figures, see JT. COMM. ESTIMATES,
supra note 19, at 10-17 table 1 (compiling tax expenditures for FYs 1988-1992).
81 See TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 21, at 313; see also Halperin, supra note
10, at 195 n.118 (estimating revenue loss to be over $67 billion).
82 See JT. COMM. ESTIMATES, supra note 19, at 15 table 1. The comparable
numbers for home mortgage interest are $28.9 billion (1988) and $32.1 billion (1992).
See id. at 12 table 1.
" There are two reasons that tax expenditure estimates might be overstated. First,
such calculations are not on a present value basis. See A. MUNNELL, supra note 4, at
46. Second, the estimates are not limited to the exclusion of investment income. See
Halperin, supra note 59, at 551-52.
"See, e.g., J. ROSENBLOOM & G. HALLMAN, supra note 16, at 13-18 (employee
welfare, corporate efficiency, attracting capable employees, labor demands, governmen-
tal pressures, and advantages of group insurance).
85 See SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., THE EM-
PLOYEE RETIREMENT SECURITY ACT OF 1974: THE FIRST DECADE, at 201-03
(Comm. Print 1984) [hereinafter FIRST DECADE]. For a discussion of the debate re-
garding whether retirement savings replace or increase savings, see generally W. An-
drews & D. Bradford, Savings Incentives in a Hybrid Income Tax (Oct. 30-31, 1986)
(unpublished paper presented at the Brookings Tax Conference, Washington, D.C.);
A. Munnell, Comments on William D. Andrews and David Bradford "Incentives to
Save in a Hybrid Tax System" (Oct 30-31, 1986) (unpublished paper presented at the
Brookings Tax Conference, Washington, D.C.). See generally Tax Reform Proposals-
XIII: Hearings Before the Senate Finance Comm., 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 41-42 (1985)
[hereinafter Proposals] (comparing relative effect on savings of pensions and IRAs); 1
DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 74, at 97-103 (summarizing debate, with focus on IRAs);
Break, supra note 55, at 59-71 (discussing theoretical approaches to and empirical
studies of the effect of social security on savings). For tax expenditure calculations, see
generally JT. COMM. ESTIMATES, supra note 19, at 2-3. If retirement savings substi-
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assets total more than $1 trillion and these assets now account for about
one-half of all available U.S. investment capital." It is therefore essen-
tial to evaluate the distribution of the benefits and burdens of this ma-
jor element of government retirement security policy.
The distribution of government benefits to employer-provided pen-
sions contrasts significantly with the targeting of social security benefits
to low- and moderate-income workers. The revenue loss attributable to
private pensions has been estimated to benefit high-income workers dis-
proportionately, and the distribution of benefits from private pension
plans is skewed in the same direction. Only 56% of nonagricultural
workers are covered by employer-sponsored pension plans, and employ-
ees with high earnings are the most likely to be covered. In 1983, only
68% of employees with earnings below $25,000 were covered, com-
pared to 82% with earnings of $25,000 or more. 7 Only the top quintile
of the income distribution receives as much private pension income as
social security income. Notwithstanding the recent expansion of pension
fund assets, of those people who had recently retired, half of the mar-
ried couples and two-thirds of the unmarried persons received no more
than $100 a month in 1982, and many of these received no private
pensions. 8 This state of affairs is not especially surprising, given the
nature of permissible limitations that employers may place on the dis-
tribution of pension benefits. These include length of work require-
ments before benefits vest,89 the inability of workers to move benefits to
new jobs,90 and the so-called integration rules,91 which, in determining
tute for general savings, the transfer probably occurs with all types of tax-favored re-
tirement vehicles. See Sheppard, AGE Conference Explores Adequacy of Private Pen-
sion System, 31 TAx NOTES 335, 335 (1986) (citing B. Bosworth, Senior Fellow,
Brookings Institute) ("[B]etween 1980 and 1983, one percent of national savings was
shifted to the IRA and Keogh plan form, while national savings fell.").
s" See RIS Hearings, supra note 74, at 183; see also Sheppard, Ways & Means
Subcommittees Consider Retirement Income Security, 28 TAx NOTES 391, 391 (1985).
See generally E. STEUERLE, supra note 34, at 15-18 (listing and discussing categories
of individual assets).
" See Proposals, supra note 85, at 29; see also EBRI, IRAs, supra note 20, at 9
table 4 (breaking down pension coverage by earnings groups); Snyder, Pension Status
of Recently Retired Workers on Their Longest Job: Findings from the New Beneficiary
Survey, Soc. SEc. BuLL. Aug. 1986, at 5, 9-10 (breaking down pension coverage by
earnings groups, gender, and type of employment).
" See Maxfield & Reno, supra note 74, at 12-13; see also Halperin, supra note
10, at 169.
" See I.R.C. § 411(a), (d)(l) (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987).
90 See I.R.C. § 401(a)(14) (1982 & West Supp. 1987).
*x I.R.C. § 401(a)(5) (West Supp. 1987); Rev. Rul. 83-110, 1983-2 C.B. 70, and
Rev. Rul. 71-446, 1971-2 C.B. 187 provide guidelines for calculating the portion of an
employer's social security payment (made on behalf of an individual employee) that
may be taken into consideration when determining eligibility for pension benefits under
the law prior to the 1986 guidelines. A further problem with such integration formulas
[Vol. 135:851
RETIREMENT SECURITY AND TAX POLICIES
whether an employer meets the nondiscrimination requirements appli-
cable to private pensions, effectively treat social security benefits as if
they were provided by employers. Even so, vested pension benefits are
distributed more widely across income brackets than other forms of sav-
ings, including IRAs.92
In any event, taking into account the distribution of tax reductions
or payments of employer-provided pensions, produces a very different
picture of our national retirement system than does considering the dis-
tribution of social security taxes and benefits alone. The Tax Reform
Act of 1986 contains a major revision of private pension rules9" in an
effort better to correlate the conditions for pension eligibility for favored
tax treatment with retirement security goals, but considerable uncer-
tainties about the effectiveness of that legislation remain. Critics are
is that they have assumed that social security replaces the preretirement earnings of low
and moderate-income workers. Yet, "Social Security benefits amount to only 35 percent
to 47 percent of preretirement earnings for individuals and couples in the bottom two
quintiles of the income distribution." FiRsT DECADE, supra note 85, at 178; see also
A. MUNNELL, supra note 4, at 20. Thus, lower paid workers may be denied any real
participation in pension benefits based on the inaccurate premise that their retirement
needs can be met solely through social security.
9' See infra note 196. EBRI calculations are for percentages of workers covered
by a pension plan. The percentages of total vested workers across income groups,
presented in the table below, can be compared to the percentages of workers with other
forms of retirement savings, although neither set of figures gives a sense of the magni-
tude of actual retirement benefits to be paid. See id.
Employment, Coverage, and Vesting Percentages:
Distribution by Earnings for Nonagricultural
Wage and Salary Workers, May 1983
Earnings % Employ- a  % ofa % of Totala
ment Coverage Vesting
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
31-4,999 12.47 5.14 1.30
$5,000-9,999 19.08 12.13 7.33
$10,000-14,999 22.20 21.80 19.87
$15,000-19,999 16.32 19.89 21.28
$20,000-24,999 12.81 17.22 20.43
$25,000-29,999 6.87 9.21 11.04
$30,000-49,999 8.23 11.71 14.75
$50,000 and over 2.01 1.89 4.01
Source: Distribution and Economics of Employer-Provided Fringe Benefits: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Social Security and Subcomm. on Select Revenue Meaaures of
the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 638, 641 table 1 (1984)
(citing preliminary EBRI tabulations from the EBRllDepartment of Health and
Human Services, Current Population Survey pension supplement) (statement of Dr.
Emily S. Andrews, EBRI Research Associate).
a. Percentages exclude 9.0% of employees whose earnings are not reported.
93 See I.R.C. §§ 401-416 (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987).
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already complaining that the 1986 legislation is inadequate from a re-
tirement security perspective,94 but this criticism ultimately may reflect
inherent difficulties in relying on voluntary employer-provided pensions
as a substantial source of retirement income for rank and file workers.
A. The Precarious Nature of Redistributional Efforts Through
Employer-Provided Pension Plans
The formulation of policy recommendations to ensure that em-
ployer-provided pension plans meet national retirement security goals is
extremely difficult. Regulation of employer-provided pensions largely
takes the form of conditions imposed on the granting of favorable tax
treatment for such pension plans.95 To use conditional tax incentives as
a principal mechanism for regulation poses an immediate dilemma be-
cause of the voluntary nature of employer-provided pension plans. On
the one hand, the creation of pension regulations always reflects a con-
cern that making qualification too difficult will inhibit the establish-
ment of pension plans. On the other hand, there is little public gain in
subsidizing employer plans that provide minimal or no benefits to low-
and moderate-income workers. In short, efforts to make voluntary pen-
sion plans better serve public retirement policy by targeting government
subsidies more toward low- and moderate-income workers may have
the effect of reducing the overall number of plans and, perhaps, the
totality of benefits provided to those classes of workers for whom such
protection seems most essential.9" The prospect of such circumstances
calls into question the appropriateness of relying on income-tax-pre-
ferred employer-sponsored pension plans to supply a major component
of retirement security.
First, it is extremely unlikely that low- and moderate-income
workers, whose wages have already been reduced by more than 14% for
social security taxes, would be willing to substitute additional deferred
compensation for current cash compensation on a dollar-for-dollar-ba-
sis, even if the deferral is subsidized through income tax reductions.
High-wage earners, however, in exchange for a tax reduction, might
well be willing to make such a tradeoff between current cash compen-
See N. Altman Lupu, supra note 2, at 64-73.
. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 401 (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987).
a See RIS Hearings, supra note 74, at 388-95 (statements of C. David Hurd,
Ass'n of Private Pension & Welfare Plans, and James Short, Vice-President, Benefits
Administration, U.S. Steel Corp., on behalf of the ERISA Industry Committee); EBRI,
IRAs, supra note 20, at 9 table 5 (showing distribution of pension, § 40(k), and IRA
participants by earnings), 12 table 9 (showing projected average annuity value of IRA
assets at age 67).
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sation and deferred compensation.9 7 The consequent creation of a mas-
sive tax subsidy for retirement security limited to high-income wage
earners, however, would be inconsistent with the public goals of a na-
tional retirement security policy.
Second, this natural distribution of private pension benefits toward
high-wage earners has been skewed further by the existence of progres-
sive rates under the income tax: the exclusion of wages from income is
worth more to a high-bracket than a low-bracket taxpayer.", The 1986
lowering of tax rates and flattening of the tax rate schedule will miti-
gate this factor somewhat, but there will remain a substantially greater
incentive for a high-income taxpayer, paying as much as a 33% margi-
nal rate under the 1986 legislation, to reduce taxes than for a lower-
earning taxpayer paying a 15% marginal rate. Moreover, borrowing
from pension plans to finance pension savings has the potential to un-
dermine the effectiveness of the tax expenditure for retirement savings.
This ability, too, disproportionately favors high earners.9"
In this context, it is clear that the private pension system depends
upon encouragement by high-earning employees for the creation and
maintenance of employer-sponsored retirement plans that redistribute
to low- and moderate-income workers at least a portion of the tax sav-
ings that otherwise would benefit high earners.100 This goal is made
more difficult, however, whenever there exist other opportunities for
high wage earners to achieve equivalent tax savings without the kinds
of restrictions applicable to employer-provided pension plans. If, for ex-
ample, high-income workers are able to achieve comparable tax bene-
7 There is some evidence that high-income workers are predisposed to save more
of their income in the short- or medium-term. See Friend, Effects of Taxation on Fi-
nancial Markets, in THE PROMISE OF TAX REFORM, supra note 34, at 87, 89.
98 One commentator has noted:
An inescapable feature of such deferral is that it provides greater benefits
to taxpayers with high marginal rates. For example, consider two employ-
ees: A is in the 50% bracket and B is in the 14% bracket. If A received
$1,000 in compensation and invested what remained after taxes in a 10%
savings account, at the end of thirty years the account would contain
$2,161 after taxes. If instead A's employer placed $1,000 in a qualified
plan for A's benefit that earned the same 10% return, at the end of thirty
years A would have $8,725 after taxes. The difference, $6,564, is essen-
tially a government subsidy paid to A because A's employer contributed
$1,000 to the plan. This subsidy gives A an effective taxable rate of return
of 20%. A similar computation for B reveals a difference of $4,787. This
amounts to giving B an effective taxable rate of return of 11.6%. The
reduction in effective tax rate is clearly greater for A than for B.
Wolk, supra note 23, at 429 (footnotes omitted).
"' See infra notes 204-09 and accompanying text.
100 For a discussion of the need to trade off tax advantages to induce participation
by low-income workers, see generally Wolk, supra note 23.
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fits through individual savings, they will be far less inclined to pressure
employers to create and maintain pension arrangements. Tax benefits
for employer-provided plans therefore have been available for sums
substantially greater than similar tax benefits available for individual
retirement savings by high-income workers. In light of these pressures,
the vitality of this nation's private pension system is somewhat surpris-
ing. Maintenance of a vital employer-provided pension system seems to
depend on employers themselves having an important stake in creating
and nurturing a pension plan. For the tax stimulant to work at all, it
seems essential that employers prefer paying a dollar of deferred com-
pensation into an employer-funded plan to paying a dollar of cash
compensation.
This requirement is frequently satisfied under the present system.
In addition to the possible benefits derived from controlling a pension
fund, the ability of employees to exclude qualified deferred compensa-
tion from income also provides an incentive for employers to substitute
deferred compensation for cash. An employee, for example, who is sub-
ject to a 28% marginal tax rate should prefer $73 of tax-free fringe
benefits to $100 of taxable wages. Employers, needless to say, would
prefer to pay $73 rather than $100 of compensation. Although the bene-
fit of deferring tax on employer contributions to pension plans is not
always equivalent in present value terms to exempting compensation
from tax,101 the attendant tax savings nevertheless should move both
employers and employees toward the tax-preferred form of compensa-
tion. How far they will move is not obvious, however, and will depend,
in part, on opportunities for other nontaxable fringe benefits and on
employees' preferences with respect to such alternatives as well as their
preferences for deferred versus cash compensation. Employers' prefer-
ences for deferred compensation can be further stimulated if the gov-
ernment provides employers with both some protection from downside
risks and some ability to capture a share of any exceptionally beneficial
performance of invested pension funds. Government involvement is nec-
essary because the existence of a pension fund, without more, often will
provide the employer with control over significant amounts of funds.
Such control would not occur if the bulk of the deferred wages were
paid as cash compensation.10 2 Finally, one should not lose sight of the
101 For examples of cases where this equivalence holds, see M. GRAETZ, supra
note 28, at 342-45. See generally Halperin, supra note 59 (suggesting a new approach
to deal with deferred compensation arrangements); Warren, supra note 59 (discussing
conditions under which deferral or acceleration will not affect present value).
10I See A. MUNNELL, supra note 4, at 93 table 5-1 (listing private pension assets
held in trust or by life insurers in selected years between 1945 and 1980); infra notes
159-62 and accompanying text (discussing question of who benefits upon termination of
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fact that employers often have nontax reasons for preferring deferred
compensation.10 -
B. The Regulation of Employer-Provided Pension Plans
Given the significant role of tax advantaged pension plans in ful-
filling this nation's retirement security goals, the regulation of em-
ployer-provided pension plans should reflect two principal concerns: (1)
does the distribution of benefits from such plans comport sufficiently
with the public function of ensuring retirement security, especially for
low- and moderate-income workers; and (2) does the distribution of
risks associated with employer-provided plans sufficiently protect work-
ers? Concerns about the distribution of benefits involve whether em-
ployees actually will receive benefits at retirement under plans main-
tained by their employers and whether the benefits received will be
adequate with respect to the wage replacement goal of retirement se-
curity. The law reflects these concerns in the form of rules (1) requiring
vesting of retirement benefits after the passage of a specified period of
time;104 (2) prohibiting discrimination of pension benefifs in favor of
high-income workers; 05 (3) permitting "integration" of employer-pro-
vided pension plans and social security; 08 (4) limiting levels of maxi-
mum benefits10 7 and requiring certain levels of minimum benefits;108
pension plans).
103 It is generally accepted that deferred compensation contingent on years of ser-
vice increases the stability of the workforce. See FIRST DECADE, supra note 85, at 181-
83. Additionally, employers use the assets built up in many retirement plans to
purchase employer securities or as a potential investment source if the fund's rate of
return is larger than that required to fund employees' future benefits. For a discussion
of employer terminations and use of plan assets, see generally Moratorium on Pension
Plan Reversions, 1984: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm.
on Labor and Human Resources, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). The existence of a
pension plan should also make it easier for employers to retire older workers, an ad-
vantage that has become of greater importance today in light of 1986 legislation barring
retirement solely because of age. See J. ROSENBLOOM & G. HALLMAN, supra note 16,
at 15 (stating that retirement plans can be used "to facilitate the systematic retirement
of older employees . . ").
104 See I.R.C. § 411(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987); see also
EMPLOYEE BENEFrr RESEARcH INSTITUTE, ISSUE BRIEF No. 51, PENSION VESTING
STANDARDS 1-4 (1986) [hereinafter EBRI, VESTING].
105 See .LR.C. §§ 401(a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(20), 410 (West Supp. 1987); see also
Treas. Reg. § 1.410(b)-l(d)(2) (1977) (describing rules applying a fair cross section
test to determine if a pension plan impermissibly discriminates in the percentage of
benefits paid to highly compensated employees).
106 See I.R.C. § 401(1) (West Supp. 1987); see also Rev. Rul. 71-446, 1971-2
C.B. 187 (pre-1986 law requirements); Treas. Reg. § 1.401-3(e) (as amended in
1971); A. MUNNELL, supra note 4, at 55-59 (discussing integration rules).
107 See I.R.C. § 415 (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987).
10s See I.R.C. § 401 (1982 & Supp. 1111985 & West Supp. 1987); §§ 410, 414
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(5) limiting employees' ability to withdraw or borrow against pension
assets;109 and (6) governing portability of pension benefits when em-
ployees change employers.
110
The law reflects concerns about the distribution of economic risks
through (1) federal insurance for pension benefits;"' (2) rules regard-
ing termination of employer-provided plans;. 2 (3) restrictions on em-
ployees' rights to borrow against or withdraw pension benefits in case
of preretirement economic hardship;" 8 (4) employers' abilities to select
defined contribution versus defined benefit plans;114 and (5) to some
extent, rules governing portability of pension benefits.1 1 5 It is neither
feasible nor desirable to discuss each of these issues in detail in this
Article, but a brief overview of the major issues should convey a sense
of the policies governing the overall distributions of benefits and risks.
The distribution of both benefits and risks of employer-provided
plans are unsatisfactory from the perspective of a unified national re-
tirement security program. Most of these rules were originally con-
ceived as mechanisms to limit potential tax abuses that would concen-
trate pension tax benefits in the hands of a few high-salaried
workers.11 6 This concern operated independently of concerns over re-
tirement security per se. It was not until 1974 that Congress restricted
(West Supp. 1987).
.09 See I.R.C. § 72(o) (special rules for distribution from qualified plans),
§ 72(p) (borrowing) (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987); §§ 72(t),
403(b)(10) (withdrawals) (West Supp. 1987).
110 See I.R.C. §§ 402(a)(5), 403(a)(4), 408(d)(3) (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West
Supp. 1987) (permitting "rollover of benefits").
... See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1309, 1321-1323, 1341-1348, 1361-1368, 1381-1461
(1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987), § 1349 (West Supp. 1987) (providing
for a plan termination insurance program); see also FIRST DECADE, supra note 85, at
147-51 (plan termination insurance). Regardless of whether plan terminations occur
because of overfunded plans or failing businesses, employees may not receive the bene-
fits for which they bargained. "In 1979, there were ten overfunded plan terminations
totalling $18 million." Id. See also Overfunded Pension Plans: Joint Hearing Before
the House Select Comm. on Aging and the Comm. on Education and Labor, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 129 (1985) [hereinafter Overfunded Pension Plans]. By 1983 the num-
ber had risen to 151, totalling $2.1 billion. For detailed examples of the negative im-
pact of pension terminations on worker pension wealth despite PBGC-provided insur-
ance, see Ippolito, Issues Surrounding Pension Terminations for Reversion, 5 J. AM.
TAx POL'Y 81, 84-85 (1986).
112 See I.R.C. § 411(d)(3) (1982 & West Supp. 1987).
11 See I.R.C. §§ 72(t)(2)(B), 403(b)(11)(B) (West Supp. 1987) (addressing med-
ical expenses and hardship withdrawals respectively); see also I.R.C. § 72(o) (special
rules for distribution from qualified plans), § 72 (p) (borrowing) (1982 & Supp. III
1985 & West Supp. 1987); §§ 72(t), 403(b)(10) (withdrawals) (West Supp. 1987).
114 See I.R.C. § 415 (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987).
115 See I.R.C. §§ 402(a)(5), 403(a)(4), 408(d)(3) (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West
Supp. 1987) (permitting "rollover of benefits").
118 See N. Altman Lupu, supra note 2, at 4-9, 19-22.
[Vol. 135:851
RETIREMENT SECURITY AND TAX POLICIES
tax benefits for employer-provided pensions to ensure that these plans
actually provide retirement security for the moderate-income workers
they ostensibly cover.117 In 1982, Congress adopted restrictions on so
called "top heavy plans" that seemed responsive predominantly to con-
cerns about the potential for tax abuses. The 1986 legislation, however,
has reaffirmed an ongoing congressional effort to conform employer-
provided pension plans to national retirement security policies."'
In evaluating the distribution of both benefits and risks of em-
ployer-provided plans, one must remain mindful that relying upon tax
inducements to encourage voluntary plans necessarily will produce
compromises. Congress will be wary of harsh rules in an effort to
maintain voluntary plans as a viable and important element of retire-
ment security for this nation's workers. At the same time, however,
Congress will endeavor to ensure that the distribution of benefits and
curtailment of risks to low- and moderate-income workers justifies the
public subsidy to employer plans. 19 As long as voluntary tax-preferred
employer plans remain the implementation mechanism for this aspect
of national retirement income security policy, the applicable regulatory
conditions must provide encouragement to both high-income workers
and employers to maintain such plans. Restrictions on alternative tax-
favored means of individual savings for retirement (or other purposes)
by high-income workers ultimately may also prove an important ele-
ment in the effectiveness of the tax stimulus to employer-provided pen-
sion plans.
1. Distribution of Benefits from Employer-Provided Plans
Notwithstanding the inherent difficulties of implementation, a
public subsidy to employer-provided pension plans can be defended
only if such plans contribute substantially and fairly to the wage re-
placement goal of public retirement security policy. This means that
such plans must assist significantly in maintaining preretirement life-
styles of low- and moderate-income workers even if they also sustain
postretirement lifestyle maintenance for high-income retirees. Histori-
cally, private pension plans have been able to obtain substantial tax
II1 See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406,
88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982 & Supp. III 1985
& West Supp. 1987)); Halperin, supra note 10, at 163; N. Altman Lupu, supra note
2, at 23-24.
"I" See 2 CONF. REP., supra note 34, at 424-27. For a discussion of the operation
of top-heavy plan rules and the changes made by the 1986 Tax Reform Act, see N.
Altman Lupu, supra note 2, at 30-43.
19 See J. ROSENBLOOM & G. HALLMAN, supra note 16, at 262-97 (overview of
pension plans).
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benefits that inure to high-income workers, even though they have
failed to provide adequate benefits to moderate-income workers.120 A
variety of rules have evolved over the years in an effort to ensure more
adequate distribution of benefits. The most important of these are re-
quirements relating to vesting, nondiscrimination, and integration with
Social Security.
Vesting requirements provide an excellent illustration of the basic
regulatory tensions. For Social Security, vesting means that a worker is
entitled to full minimum social security benefits immediately after pay-
ing social security taxes for a minimum number of earnings quarters. 121
This nonforfeitable right to social security benefits moves with the em-
ployee across jobs and across employers. In contrast, nonforfeitable
rights to employer-provided pension benefits do not accrue until the
employee has worked for the same employer for a specified period of
time during which the employer has made pension contributions on
that employee's behalf.122 In addition, changing jobs may trigger the
payment of vested pension benefits and thereby eliminate their role as a
source of income during retirement years.12 ' Daniel Halperin has noted
the tension inherent in such a scheme: If an employer is not required to
have a pension plan, what justification-other than the potential for
tax abuse-exists for minimum vesting requirements? On the other
hand, if pension plan contributions are substitutes for cash compensa-
tion, how can one justify anything other than immediate full vesting?
1 24
Although the Treasury Department long had attacked what it re-
garded as excessive delays in vesting as violating nondiscrimination
standards,1 25 Congress did not require a minimum vesting schedule un-
til it enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA").126 ERISA contained three alternative minimum vesting
schedules. The first schedule required the full vesting of benefits upon
the completion of ten years of job service with the same employer (ten-
11 For example, in 1977, 66% of the tax benefits for employer plans went to the
16% of employees with incomes over $20,000. See A. MUNNELL, supra note 4, at 45-
46. See generally N. Altman Lupu, supra note 2, at 19-30 (history of nondiscrimina-
tion provisions).
. The number of earnings quarters needed has changed over time, so different
standards apply to different age groups. See 42 U.S.c. § 413 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
"' For an explanation of the three primary vesting rules instituted under ERISA,
see EBRI, VESTING, supra note 104, at 2-4.
" See Halperin, supra note 10, at 178.
124 See D. Halperin, Unpublished Class Materials for Course on Retirement Se-
curity, Yale Law School (Spring 1986).
125 See N. Altman Lupu, supra note 2, at 18-21.
126 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982 & Supp. III 1985 &
West Supp. 1987)).
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year cliff vesting). The second schedule provided for 25% vesting begin-
ning after the completion of five years of service, increasing to 100%
after fifteen years of service. The third schedule mandated partial vest-
ing of 50% after ten years of service with an additional 10% of the
benefit vesting each year until 100% vesting occurred after fifteen years
of service.127 The latter option was limited to plans that factor in age as
well as service years. Beginning in 1982, so-called "top heavy plans"
were required to meet three-year cliff vesting or six-year gradual vest-
ing requirements. 2
Conditioning the receipt of pension benefits on such length of ser-
vice requirements is most detrimental to marginal or unconventional
workers. Part-time workers (those working 500-1000 hours per year)
can be entirely excluded under current pension participation stan-
dards. " 9 Further, as the workforce becomes more mobile, increasing
numbers of workers will forfeit pension contributions made on their
behalf because of insufficient periods of employment with the same em-
ployer. Vesting requirements also tend adversely to affect low income
workers. Finally, vesting requirements operate particularly to the detri-
ment of minorities and women because of the demographics of the ca-
reer patterns of these groups. Minorities have particula. difficulties ac-
cumulating pension benefits because of their mobility, high rates of
unemployment, and employment in jobs not covered by plans.13 Simi-
larly, the average woman stays at a job only 3.7 years, while the aver-
age man stays at a job 5.1 years. 31 Stringent vesting requirements cre-
127 See I.R.C. § 411 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), amended by I.R.C. § 411 (West
Supp. 1987); EBRI, VESTING, supra note 104, at 2-3.
228 I.R.C. § 416(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
120 See I.R.C. § 410(a)(4) (1982); COMING OF AGE, supra note 3, at 34.
130 See The Black Elderly in Poverty: Hearing Before the House Select Comm. on
Aging, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 4-5 (1985); COMING OF AGE, supra note 3, at 34. The gap
between salaries of white males and salaries of minorities and women, part-time and
household work patterns, and greater mobility combine to create inadequate retirement
coverage for many. For example, "[w]omen make up 60% of the part-time workers
• . . three-fifths of them have over one year of service, 21% of them have five years or
more, yet [they] can be excluded if they work less than 1,000 hours a year." RIS Hear-
ings, supra note 74, at 493. Similarly, the types of jobs dominated by disproportionate
numbers of minorities and women are characterized by low wages and inadequate ben-
efits. See Root, Employee Benefits and Social Welfare: Complement and Conflict, 479
ANNALS 101, 115-17 (1985).
131 See RIS Hearings, supra note 74, at 493; EBRI, VESTING, supra note 104, at
11 (noting that job tenure has decreased to a median of 4 years for men and 1.5 years
for women). It should be noted that, in practice, stringent vesting requirements have
deprived important numbers of low- and moderate-income employees of any employer-
provided pension benefits. See Snyder, supra note 87, at 10 table 7, 11 (noting that
"industry and years elapsed since [an employee's] longest job were most critical").
"[O]ver one million more men and 766,000 more women would have been vested in
1985 had there been a 5-year vesting standard." EBRI, VESTING, supra note 104, at 9.
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ate a high rate of forfeited contributions that may be distributed among
remaining plan participants, and have had the effect of redistributing
pension contributions from lower paid employees to higher paid em-
ployees with more years of service. Strict vesting requirements reduce
employer costs and further concentrate the tax advantages received by
high-income employees. For these reasons, pension vesting require-
ments may serve to reverse some of the progressive redistributive effects
of social security benefits.'
3 2
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 ("the 1986 Act") replaces the three
minimum vesting standards of ERISA with two new minimum re-
quirements. Under the new rules, an employer must either fully vest
pension benefits in workers after five years of service or vest 20% of
benefits each year beginning at the end of three years of service so that
such employees will be fully vested at the end of seven years of ser-
vice." 3 These requirements represent a substantial improvement on the
ERISA standards. If a five-year standard had been applicable in 1985,
almost 2 million additional workers would have been entitled to vested
benefits-a 7% increase in the number of men and a 10% increase in
women."" Greater coverage requirements would have made 6.3 million
more women eligible for pension benefits than prior law.133 The 1986
vesting rules retain these length of employment conditions as a means
of promoting stability in the workforce and avoiding the additional ad-
ministrative costs of an immediate vesting standard. It remains to be
seen, however, whether the 1986 rules will attain either the retirement
132 A simple example of an employer-defined contribution plan demonstrates the
wealth transfer from low-paid, nonvested employees to high-paid, vested employees
participating in the plan. The example assumes that employee D leaves the employer
before benefits vest and is replaced by employee E who will not begin to participate for
three years.
Compensation Acct. Balance Contrib. Forfeiture Acct. % of
First Year 2nd Year Allocated Bal. Total
A $100,000 $16,189 $16,051 $ 744 $32,984 62.8
B 50,000 7,017 6,948 372 14,337 27.3
C 20,000 2,529 2,501 149 5,179 9.9
D 10,000 1,265 - - - -
E 10,000 - - - - -
$27,000 $25,500 $1,265 $52,500 100.0
Source: Wolk, supra note 23, at 450 table III.
Although forfeitures from defined benefit plans may not be used to increase other
participants' benefits, regardless of plan type, forfeitures are advantageous to employ-
ers. The employer can use such forfeitures to reduce contributions to the plan or to
offset administrative expenses. See 2 CONF. Ra., supra note 34, at 442.
"I See I.R.C. § 411(a)(2) (West Supp. 1987).
134 See EBRI, VESTING, supra note 104, at 9.
133 Only 11.5% of women over 65 have private pensions. See RIS Hearings, supra
note 74, at 492-95.
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security or tax justice advantages of an immediate vesting rule.
The 1986 Act also strengthens the nondiscrimination standards
and the rules permitting integration of employer-provided pension
plans and Social Security.""' In theory, the nondiscrimination require-
ments are present in the Code for the purpose of inhibiting tax abuse
prospects and ensuring that employer-provided pensions satisfy retire-
ment income security goals. These requirements operate by permitting
pension plan contributions and earnings to qualify for tax-advantaged
treatment only if a substantial number of lower paid employees partici-
pate in the plan. The basic requirement is stated as a minimum level of
coverage necessary for a plan to qualify for favorable tax treatment.
187
Prior to the 1986 legislation, nondiscrimination coverage require-
ments could be met by satisfaction of any of three alternative tests.1'"
The 1986 legislation replaces these tests with a combination of a per-
centage coverage test and a minimum employee coverage requirement.
Specifically, under the 1986 Act, the nondiscrimination requirement
will be satisfied if the percentage of employees covered under the plan
who do not earn high wages is at least 70% of the highly compensated
employees covered under the plan'1 9 and if the lesser of fifty employees
or 40% of all employees are covered by the plan. 4° The 1986 Act,
however, does not eliminate the ability of employer-provided plans to
qualify for favorable tax treatment even though they cover a lower per-
centage of middle-income workers than of high-income workers. Al-
though the 1986 changes in the nondiscrimination requirements were
designed to confine tax advantages for employer pensions to those plans
that meet retirement security goals, it seems unlikely that this tighten-
ing of the rules will prove adequate. A number of important exceptions
to the nondiscrimination requirements remain,14 1 and coverage of low-
and moderate-income employees remains restricted by the ability of em-
138 See I.R.C. §§ 410(b)(1)(B), 411(b)(c) (West Supp. 1987).
113 See I.R.C. § 410(b) (West Supp. 1987).
138 A plan satisfied pre-Tax Reform Act coverage rules if it benefited at least 70%
of all employees or a percentage of eligible employees equalling at least 56% of all
employees, see I.R.C. § 410(b)(1) (1982), amended by I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(26), 410(b)(1)
(West Supp. 1987), or if it met the classification test as applied in Rev. Rul. 83-58,
1983-1 C.B. 95, such that there was a reasonable difference between the ratio of highly
compensated and not highly compensated employees benefited. See I.R.C. § 410(b)(2)
(1982) (permitting an employer to set up classifications, as long as the Secretary finds
such classifications to be nondiscriminatory).
139 See I.R.C. § 410(b)(1) (West Supp. 1987).
140 See I.R.C. § 401(a)(26) (West Supp. 1987).
141 Two examples are the exceptions for part-time employees, see I.R.C.
§ 410(b)(4) (West Supp. 1987), and employees covered by collective bargaining agree-
ments, see I.R.C. § 410(b)(3) (West Supp. 1987).
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ployers to integrate their pension plans with social security benefits. 42
Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, rules permitting integration
of employer-provided plans with social security benefits allowed em-
ployers to limit pension benefits to employees whose earnings exceeded
the social security wage ceiling. 143 The 1986 legislation simplifies the
extraordinarily complex rules of prior law, attempts to increase em-
ployer contributions and benefits on behalf of low-wage earners, and
eliminates the ability of employers to provide no benefits for low-wage
earners but nevertheless qualify for favorable tax treatment. 44 The
new integration rules, however, continue the prior practice of allowing
employer plans to take into account the disproportionately larger bene-
fits of Social Security for low- and moderate-income workers and
thereby to provide disproportionately greater benefits to high-wage
earners, so long as proportionate benefits are achieved in combination
throughout the wage scale.'45 The basic concept of allowing integration
of employer plans and Social Security is consistent with a unified view
of retirement security policy. On the other hand, such a policy allows
benefits under employer plans to reverse the progressive distribution of
social security benefits and, even after the improvements of the 1986
legislation, fails to ensure a coherent structure of retirement benefits in
terms of a sliding-scale-percentage wage-replacement goal that would
provide greater proportional wage replacement for low- and moderate-
income workers.
2. Distribution of Risks from Employer-Provided Plans
To structure a program of providing security for retiring workers
that relies heavily on employer-provided pension plans necessarily re-
quires a determination about the allocation of a variety of risks among
employers, employees, and the government. There are a variety of rea-
Many plans meet the nondiscrimination standards only if the social security
benefits and payments are taken into account as if they were pension benefits provided
by an employer under a pension plan. See I.R.C. § 401(1) (West Supp. 1987).
143 See I.R.C. § 401(l) (1982), amended by I.R.C. § 401(1) (West Supp. 1987).
144 See I.R.C. § 401(a)(5) (West Supp. 1987).
145 Although the 1986 Tax Reform Act reduces the percentage disparity allowed,
see I.R.C. § 401(a) (West Supp. 1987), employees earning more than $42,000 still can
contribute a higher percentage of their annual income to a tax-advantaged pension
plan. For example, under a defined contribution plan, the employer still can contribute
at a rate of 10%, for compensation in excess of $42,000, while contributing only 5% for
compensation below $42,000. Such a plan will be held not to be discriminatory in favor
of highly paid individuals. See id.; see also N. Altman Lupu, supra note 2, at 61-69
(discussing how the "fiction" that Social Security involves payments into individual
accounts is used to justify regressive benefit or contribution payments under qualified
private pensions).
[Vol. 135:851
RETIREMENT SECURITY AND TAX POLICIES
sons that an employer-provided plan ultimately might fail in reaching
the ideal outcome of providing employees full replacement of preretire-
ment wages when combined with social security.14 As indicated above,
such failures are often due to vesting requirements and limitations on
portability of pension benefits that, in effect, require an employee to
bear the risks of changing employers, whether as a result of events in
the employee's life or due to economic factors affecting the employer.
Even for employees who spend their entire working lives with the
same employer, however, the risk that their pensions will be inadequate
is significant. For example, an employee may experience preretirement
adversity and a concomitant need to withdraw funds from a pension
plan; the investment earnings of the plan may be lower than antici-
pated; the employee's compensation may have increased to a higher
level than expected; inflation both prior and subsequent to retirement
may be greater than anticipated or (as is the case with most private
plans) the plan may not provide for postretirement inflation; because of
funding or earnings, the plan may have insufficient assets upon termi-
nation (either of the plan or of employment), and Pension Benefit
Guarantee Corporation Insurance may or may not provide an adequate
replacement; the employee may have to retire early; and, finally, the
employee's service may have begun prior to the adoption of the em-
ployer's plan, and pre-adoption service may not be covered.
147
A variety of specific provisions also affect the allocation of risks of
employer-provided plans among employers, employees, and the govern-
ment. These include the existence and scope of federal pension insur-
ance benefits1 48 as well as rules governing vesting 49 and portability. 5
Other factors affecting risk distribution include whether the plan is
structured as a defined contribution or defined benefit plan, rules con-
cerning termination of employer-provided plans, and rules establishing
conditions and penalties for preretirement withdrawals of accumulated
benefits. A discussion of these latter three issues will illuminate the
146 See Halperin, supra note 10, at 161 n.13, 168-71, 182-90.
147 See generally Overfunded Pension Plans, supra note 111, at 127-34 (re-
printing materials on plan terminations and asset reversions to employers, in appen-
dix); Halperin, supra note 10 (discussing the security of benefits under defined benefit
and defined contribution plans); N. Altman Lupu, supra note 2, at 40-49 (discussing a
worker security proposal).
148 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1309, 1321-1323, 1341-1348, 1361-1368, 1381-1461
(1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West Supp. 1987) (providing for a plan termination insur-
ance program).
149 See I.R.C. § 411 (1982 & West Supp. 1987); EBRI, VESTING, supra note
104, at 1-4.
160 See I.R.C. §§ 402(a)(5), 403(a)(4), 408(d)(3) (1982 & Supp. III 1985 & West
Supp. 1987) (permitting "rollover of benefits").
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most important considerations.
Employer-sponsored pension plans are of two general types: de-
fined benefit or defined contribution. A defined benefit plan determines
retirement payments under a benefit formula that usually takes one of
three types: (1) a flat-benefit formula, which pays a specific dollar
amount for each year of service under the plan; (2) a career-average
formula, which bases the benefit on a percentage of career-average pay,
multiplied by the employee's years of service; or (3) a final-pay
formula, which bases benefits on the employee's average earnings dur-
ing a specified number of years immediately prior to retirement.1 51 A
defined contribution plan, in contrast, requires employers to pay a spe-
cific amount into the pension fund for each employee participant and
ascribes the accumulation of payments and their investment earnings to
each employee. Under a defined contribution plan, the employer's con-
tributions are either a percentage of salary or, less often, of profits. The
retirement benefits under such a plan will be determined based solely
on the accumulated amount in the participant's account at retire-
ment. 52 Defined benefit plans remain the dominant type of plan, but
recent years have apparently produced a shift toward defined contribu-
tion plans.1 5" This movement away from defined benefit plans raises
the major policy question whether to adopt rules inhibiting such a
trend, for example by providing greater inducements to defined benefit
plans or imposing new restrictions on defined contribution plans.
Several factors are relevant in making such a policy decision. First,
a defined benefit plan may be more precisely geared toward satisfying a
specific-percentage wage-replacement goal for each employee than a
defined contribution plan.1 ' This means that under defined benefit
plans employers bear most of the risks of unexpected patterns of com-
pensation over time as well as the risks of investment performance. In
addition, whenever benefits are based on final pay, the employer also
bears the risk of unanticipated preretirement inflation, although the
employee typically bears the risks of postretirement inflation. Second,
defined benefit plans have historically taken into account employee ser-
vice prior to institution of the plan, but defined contribution plans have
"ll Z. BODIE, A. MARcus & R. MERTON, DEFINED BENEFIT VERSUS DEFINED
CONTRIBUTION PENSION PLANS: WHAT ARE THE REAL TRADEOFFS? 3-4 (National
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 1719, 1985) [hereinafter NBER
Paper].
'"2 See id. at 2.
153 See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 99TH CONG., 1ST SESS., PRIVATE PENSIONS
PLANS: WHICH WAY ARE THEY HEADED? 14 table 2 (Comm. Print 1985) [hereinaf-
ter CRS]; FIRST DECADE, supra note 85, at 116 table 3.
"I See CRS, supra note 153, at 3.
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not.155 Third, defined contribution plans shift the risks of changes in
real wages to employees and, in addition, require employees to bear
investment risks.' 56 Finally, while the stability of retirement benefits as
a percentage of wage replacement is the major advantage claimed for
defined benefit plans, 5 7 defined contribution plans typically offer em-
ployees a clearer picture of the value of their accumulating retirement
benefits. Under a defined contribution plan, a participant may at any
time readily ascertain the present value of the retirement assets accu-
mulated in the plan on her behalf.'5 " As the factors listed here suggest,
it is inherently more difficult for an employee to determine the assets
that will be available for retirement under a defined benefit plan. Not
surprisingly, many retirees have discovered that their actual retirement
benefits are substantially less than they had anticipated.
Rules concerning termination of employer-provided plans also af-
fect the allocation of risks of such plans among employers, employees,
and the government. The choice between defined benefit and defined
contribution plans affects the ability of employers to capture benefits
either by reducing future contributions or by terminating plans when
their investment performance provides a funding level greater than the
accrued liabilities under the plan. Greater than expected inflation in
recent years has resulted in a number of defined benefit plans that have
assets in excess of accrued liabilities.'59 For example, recent estimates
indicate that 88% of defined benefit plans of Fortune 500 companies
had assets greater than 1983 year-end liabilities and more than 34% of
such plans had assets one and a half times as large as liabilities. 60
Under current law, these plans not only allow employers to use the
excess investment returns to decrease future contributions to the plan,
but they also present opportunities for termination.' 6 ' If a plan is ter-
minated, the employer typically will disband the trust fund and pay
benefits to vested workers in a lump-sum distribution or, alternatively,
will purchase retirement annuities for them. Any excess will be cap-
tured by the employer, who then must make a choice. The employer
may refuse to establish a new plan, thereby declining to play any fu-
155 See id.
15 See NBER Paper, supra note 151, at 4.
157 See Halperin, supra note 10, at 183-85.
15 See CRS, supra note 153, at 4 (noting the ease with which an employer can
determine the pension obligation owed to the employee).
159 See Overfunded Pension Plans, supra note 111, at 128-29.
160 See Personal Savings Down, Linked to Pension Funding, Study Finds, J.
Acc r., Feb. 1986, at 24 (discussing National Bureau of Economic Research Study No.
1622).
161 See Stein, Raiders of the Corporate Pension Plan: The Reversion of Excess
Plan Assets to the Employer, 5 AM. J. TAx PoL'Y 117, 127-33 (1986).
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ture role in its employees' retirement savings or, as is often the case, the
employer may create a new plan.162 Whichever option the employer
chooses it is clear that defined benefit plans routinely have produced
opportunities for employers to use pension funds as a means of ac-
cumulating investment income tax-free, without ensuring that stated re-
tirement security goals or retirement benefits expected by their workers
actually will be realized.
In sum, defined benefit plans, because of their direct connection to
wage replacement, ostensibly seem better targeted to workers' retire-
ment security concerns than defined contribution plans. 163 Without im-
mediate vesting requirements and restrictions on plan terminations,
however, defined benefit plans ultimately may disappoint employees'
expectations for retirement pensions. Consequently, defined contribu-
tion plans may offer considerable advantages for many workers. De-
fined contribution plans also may encourage employers who otherwise
would have no plan at all to establish at least a limited plan that, over
time, may provide significant retirement savings for employees. So long
as having a pension plan remains voluntary, retaining flexibility for
employers to choose between defined benefit and defined contribution
plans may prove to be an important element in inducing employers to
maintain pension plans. Employers' preferences, of course, will depend
upon their attitude about shifting or retaining wage and investment
risks.
A final set of provisions affecting the allocation of risks of em-
ployer-provided plans are rules establishing conditions and penalties for
preretirement withdrawals of accumulated benefits. In particular, the
1986 Act includes new limitations on the ability of employees to gain
access to pension funds prior to retirement. 1 These provisions were
adopted principally as a means of ensuring that tax advantages in-
tended for retirement savings will be recaptured whenever such savings
do not satisfy the retirement security goal.16 5 New restrictions on bor-
rowing against pension assets also were included in the 1986 legisla-
tion.166 In both cases, Congress seemed to be concerned principally with
162 See id. at 129-30.
163 See NBER Paper, supra note 151, at 13, 27; Wolk, supra note 23, at 422-24.
The Act imposes tax penalties for most early distributions from qualified plans
to recoup the initial tax advantage gained. With some exceptions, the Act applies an
additional 10% income tax to all early distributions included in an employee's gross
income. See I.R.C. § 72(t) (West Supp. 1987); see also EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RE-
SEARCH INSTITUTE, ISSUE BRIEF No. 59, TAX REFORM AND EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 18
(1986) [hereinafter EBRI, TAX REFORM].
16 See 2 CONF. REP., supra note 34, at 457 (characterizing the additional tax as
a recapture tax).
16 The Act tightens the ability of participants to maintain a revolving, tax-de-
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the tax abuse potential inherent in a regime that would erroneously
allow preretirement withdrawals.
The withdrawal issue once again demonstrates the inherent diffi-
culties of placing heavy reliance on a voluntary mechanism as a means
of funding basic retirement security for workers. If employees believe
that they must retain pension assets in the pension fund until retire-
ment, regardless of any preretirement hardships they might experience,
they may be quite reluctant to engage in this form of savings and will
tend to prefer cash to deferred compensation, even at some tax cost. On
the other hand, if free withdrawal from retirement savings plans were
permitted without substantial penalty, it would be foolhardy for Con-
gress to rely on such plans to provide workers with significant assets
upon retirement. Moreover, the risks of long-term savings limited to
retirement seem to bear disproportionately on low- and moderate-in-
come workers who may be most concerned about access to such assets
in times of emergency. The limitations on early withdrawals and loans
contained in the 1986 Act reflect congressional compromises between
these competing considerations.
From a retirement income security perspective alone, the danger
inherent in preretirement withdrawals is self-evident. Loans from pen-
sion funds, however, seem less threatening than preretirement with-
drawals or distributions. The worker at least has an obligation to re-
turn borrowed amounts to the retirement fund. This obligation,
however, does not solve the problem, for loans may threaten signifi-
cantly the retirement security goal of income tax expenditure provisions
and undermine both tax policy and retirement policy objectives.10' This
limits the feasibility of the natural response of retirement security pro-
ponents: to enact tougher rules on preretirement withdrawals or distri-
butions coupled with relatively liberal rules governing the ability of
workers to borrow pension funds upon a showing of genuine hard-
ship."'8 The problem of borrowing is considered further following a
ductible loan from their qualified plan account by reducing the amount of the loan in
the current year by the highest balance in the previous 12 months, limiting extended
repayment periods for home loan purchases, and denying an interest deduction for loan
repayment by key employees and § 401(k) plan contributors. See I.R.C. § 72(p) (West
Supp. 1987); see also EBRI, TAX REFORM, supra note 164, at 18.
267 See SENATE FINANCE COMM., TAX REFORM Acr OF 1986, S. REP. No. 313,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 639 (1986) [hereinafter FINANCE COMM.]; Halperin, supra note
10, at 182; Finance Committee Considers Pension and Estate Issues, 31 TAX NOTES
106, 107 (1986) (statement of Sen. Danforth identifying how interest-deduction tax
incentives thwart retirement savings goals). For an extended discussion of this issue, see
infra notes 204-09 and accompanying text.
I" The 1986 Act provides substantial retrictions on early reversions and distribu-
tions of plan assets through tax penalties and rollover requirements that recoup the
initial tax incentives for retirement savings. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 72(o) (additional tax
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discussion of the income tax incentives for individual retirement
savings.
IV. INDIVIDUAL SAVINGS FOR RETIREMENT
The third element of this nation's retirement income security pro-
gram is individual savings. Necessarily, such savings will prove an ef-
fective source of retirement income only for those individuals who are
able to save during their working lives or who have acquired invest-
ment assets from another source. The ability privately to save adequate
retirement assets therefore will tend to be concentrated in the high-
income classes.
As before, tax policy plays an important role. Because of the cur-
rent taxation of investment income, an income tax has a natural ten-
dency to favor current consumption as opposed to deferred consump-
tion. In other words, an income tax is inherently less favorable toward
savings than would be a consumption or wage tax."69 Therefore, the
reliance of the federal government on the individual income tax as an
important source of revenues makes individual savings more costly than
would be true if such revenues were raised through, for example, con-
sumption taxation.170 As a result, a variety of income tax preferences
have been enacted over the years in an effort both to stimulate savings
generally and to encourage either particular kinds of investments or
savings for specified purposes.
Two categories of income tax incentives for individual savings are
important here. First, this Article addresses individual savings incen-
tives limited to retirement savings to determine their efficacy and to
on early withdrawals of previously deductible employee contributions), 72(t) (additional
tax on early withdrawals), 402(a) (rollover requirements), 402(e)(4)(B) (rules regard-
ing lump sum distribution), 4974 (excise tax on certain accumulations), 4980 (tax on
reversion of qualified plan assets to employer), 4981A (tax on excess distributions from
qualified plans) (West Supp. 1987). The liberal definition of the circumstances that
constitute a hardship for loan purposes is not changed from present law, but the maxi-
mum amount of money borrowed is limited. See I.R.C. § 72(p)(2)(A) (West Supp.
1987) (reducing $50,000 limit by the balance of certain preceding loans); see also
EBRI, TAX REFORM, supra note 164, at 18. Capping the amount of pension assets
available to be borrowed and barring the loan's interest deductibility, while allowing
loans for a wide variety of circumstances, encourages the middle-income earner to
earmark contributions for retirement while providing a safety valve. The interest and
loan amount restrictions discourage borrowing solely for tax arbitrage. See infra notes
204-09 and accompanying text.
169 See E. STEUERLE, supra note 34, at 171-75; Halperin, supra note 59, at 523-
24. For a more general discussion, see M. GRAETZ, supra note 28, at 20 and n.*
(compiling some of the leading articles on the issue).
170 See sources cited supra note 169. See generally WHAT SHOULD BE TAXED:
INCOME OR EXPENDrrURES? (J. Pechman ed. 1980) (comparing effects of different tax
systems).
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ascertain their potential impact on tax incentives for employer-provided
pension plans. This will be followed by a consideration of individual
savings incentives that are not explicitly directed toward retirement sav-
ings, both to evaluate their potential impact on Congress's ability to
impose conditions on incentives for retirement savings and to examine
the extent to which savings not initially undertaken for retirement ulti-
mately may prove an important source of income during retirement.
Finally, the ways in which the ability to borrow undermines both re-
tirement security and tax policy goals will be examined.
A. Income Tax Incentives for Retirement Savings
The closest retirement savings analogue to employer-sponsored
pension plans is the so-called Keogh Plans for self-employed persons."'
Benefits analogous to those available to employees under qualified pen-
sion plans were made available to self-employed persons in 1962, but
maximum benefits were far more restrictive. The maximum annual
contribution was limited to $2500 in 1962172 and had been increased to
only $15,000 by 1982.13 In contrast, pension benefits for employees
were first subjected to a ceiling by ERISA in 1974.171 The Tax Equity
and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 generally created parity between
Keogh plans and qualified pension plans. The revenue loss for Keogh
plans was estimated at $2 billion in 1986.175
In recent years, the most important tax incentive for individual
retirement savings has been the Individual Retirement Account. When
the tax preference for IRAs was originally enacted in 1974, it provided
an opportunity for tax-advantaged savings limited in amount and eligi-
bility. 1 7 For example, persons could not qualify for the tax reduction if
they were covered under an employer-sponsored pension plan. This re-
I For a general discussion of Keogh plans, see Lucas, IRAs, SEPs and KE-
OGHs, 18 AKRON L. REv. 609 (1985); Smith, A Comment on IRAs and Keoghs, 38
NAT'L TAX J. 111 (1985); Comment, There Should Be Parity in Bankruptcy Between
Keogh Plans and Other ERISA Plans, 80 Nw. U.L. REv. 165 (1985).
172 See Self-Employed Individuals Tax Retirement Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-
792, § 3(b), 76 Stat. 809, 820 (1962).
173 See I.R.C. § 404(e)(1) (1982), repealed by Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsi-
bility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 238(a), 96 Stat. 304, 512.
17, See I.R.C. § 415(b)(1) (1976), amended by I.R.C. § 415(b)(1) (West Supp.
1987) (limiting benefits under employer-sponsored plans to $75,000); I.R.C.
§ 415(c)(1) (1976), amended by I.R.C. § 415(c)(1) (West Supp. 1987) (limiting con-
tributions to $25,000 annually). These maximums, when adjusted for inflation, see
I.R.C. § 415(d) (1976), amended by I.R.C. § 415(d) (West Supp. 1987) (authorizing
annual cost-of-living adjustments), were $136,425 for benefits and $45,475 for contri-
butions by 1982. See M. GRAETZ, supra note 28, at 802.
17' See EBRI, IRAs, supra note 20, at 2.
176 See I.R.C. § 219(b) (1976), amended by I.R.C. § 219(b) (West Supp. 1987).
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striction was, to some extent, an effort to be responsive to concerns ex-
pressed by organized labor, which opposed the IRA deduction because
of fear that such a deduction would deter employers from establishing
pension plans for employees. 1 7 In 1981, tax legislation dramatically
expanded opportunities for IRAs by allowing all individuals identical
tax savings. Up to $2000 of annual earnings was permitted to be ex-
cluded from the income tax base through an immediate deduction. In
addition, investment earnings on IRAs could be accumulated free of
current income tax, with payments from the account during retirement
includable in the recipient's income.
178
The 1981 extension of IRA eligibility to all workers produced a
revenue loss more than six times greater than that which was originally
estimated.179 At the end of 1981, IRA and Keogh assets totalled slightly
more than $38 billion; at the end of 1985, they amounted to $224 bil-
lion.180 Although the bulk of this revenue loss has been concentrated
among high-earning employees, the mass marketing of IRAs by savings
institutions apparently induced large numbers of middle-income tax-
payers to shift away from general savings accounts, which are not eligi-
ble for tax savings, to tax-preferred retirement savings. At the end of
1982, people with less than $20,000 of taxable income accounted for
14.6% of the total IRA deductions claimed on income tax returns, com-
pared to 28.4% for people with over $50,000 in taxable income.' Only
15.3% of people making between $15,000 and $20,000 had an IRA,
compared to 59.7% of those earning $50,000 or more. 8 2 The revenue
loss from the IRA provisions was estimated to be $12.5 billion in
19848 s It is worth noting, however, that, in this context, where eligi-
bility for and use of IRAs was widespread, the relatively small $2000
limit on annual IRA savings seems to have been quite significant in
reducing the potential threat of IRAs to employer-provided plans. The
$2000 amount is not high enough (compared to maximum limitations
on employer pension plans) to eliminate the desire of high- and middle-
177 See M. GRAETZ, supra note 28, at 803.
178 See I.R.C. § 408 (1982) amended by I.R.C. § 408 (West Supp. 1987); see
also 1 DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 74, at 100-02; EBRI, IRAs, supra note 20, at 4;
Halperin, supra note 10, at 159-63.
117 See 1 DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 74, at 101.
180 See EBRI, IRAs, supra note 20, at 2, 5, 6-7.
181 See Proposals, supra note 85, at 34.
182 See EBRI, IRAs, supra note 20, at 8 table 3. Additionally, 46% of IRAs are
held by employees with vested pension rights. See 1 DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 74, at
102.
Iss See EBRI, IRAs, supra note 20, at 13 table 10. For estimates of projected
revenue losses from IRAs through 1992, see JT. COMM. ESTIMATES, supra note 19, at
15.
[Vol. 135:851
RETIREMENT SECURITY AND TAX POLICIES
income workers for the development and maintenance of employer-
sponsored pension plans.
The 1986 Act once again restricted the ability to enjoy the full
benefits of IRAs only to individuals not covered by employer plans.
Under the 1986 legislation, single persons with more than $25,000 of
income and married couples with more than $40,000 of income who
are covered by employer plans are no longer eligible to deduct IRA
contributions, but they may continue to receive tax-free accumulations
of investment income both on their pre-1986 contributions to IRAs and
with respect to additional annual IRA contributions of not more than
$2000 a year."8 ' With this change, it has been estimated that, of the
24.4 million individuals who had opened an IRA prior to the Tax Re-
form Act, 15% or 3.7 million individuals would have lost the IRA de-
duction completely, 12% or 2.9 million individuals would have been
eligible for a partial deduction, and 73% or 17.8 million would have
been eligible for a full deduction had the Tax Reform Act been in ef-
fect.185 The Senate Finance Committee estimated that the elimination
of the deduction for IRA contributions for people covered by pension
plans would raise $25 billion of revenue over the fiscal years 1986-
19911 8 and thereby contribute significantly to Congress's ability to
lower income tax rates. Given the inaccuracy of prior estimates of peo-
ple's behavior in response to IRA tax incentives, however, it is difficult
to predict how many people will continue to establish or add to IRA
accounts to take advantage of this more limited tax incentive or, alter-
natively, will begin or expand savings through other tax-preferred vehi-
cles to retain the advantages that were available through IRAs under
prior law.
Congress did not adopt the 1986 restrictions on IRAs in response
to concerns about their potential impact on employer-provided pension
plans. On the contrary, retirement security concerns were dwarfed by
other fiscal policies. The politics of the 1986 tax reform bill required a
reduction in the top income tax rates that absent massive and unaccept-
able revenue losses could be accomplished only by slashing a wide vari-
ety of tax incentives, including IRAs.187 Congress's primary concern
1" See I.R.C. §§ 219, 408 (West Supp. 1987); see also EBRI, TAx REFORM,
supra note 164, at 20. The new tax restrictions regarding IRAs are effective beginning
with IRAs established after 1986 or post-1986 additions to existing IRAs. The Senate
version of the 1986 Act would have eliminated deductible IRAs for all persons covered
by an employer plan. See 2 CONF. REP., supra note 34, at 375-76
185 See EBRI, TAx REFORM, supra note 164, at 19.
196 See FiNANCE COMM., supra note 167, at 23 table 111-2.
157 See id. at 31 ("The committee bill broadens the base of the individual and
corporate income taxes, principally for the purpose of reducing marginal tax rates.").
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was that the long-term potential revenue loss from this increasingly
popular retirement savings incentive would require significantly higher
income tax rates than would be possible with the more limited incen-
tive.""8 Congress also was aware of the evidence that the IRA provi-
sions had not been particularly effective in stimulating overall national
savings. Widely available IRAs apparently had instead induced a mas-
sive shift of general savings to IRAs."8 9 From the perspective of retire-
ment security policy, such a shift of savings may be desirable, even
without any substantial increase in aggregate national savings.1 90 The
1986 restrictions on income tax incentives for IRAs, however, demon-
strate an important practical difficulty in relying heavily upon income
tax incentives as a principal mechanism for implementing national re-
tirement security policy: retirement security concerns often may be
overridden by Congress's perceptions of more pressing fiscal policy
needs.
Almost by accident, however, the IRA provisions are now struc-
tured quite nicely to serve retirement security goals. Tax benefits of the
sort available to employer-provided pensions are available only to high-
income employees if they are not covered by employer pension plans. In
fact, for these workers, the $2000 annual ceiling seems quite low com-
pared to potential pension or Keogh benefits."9 ' Other individuals cov-
ered by employer plans are allowed to earn tax-free investment income
with respect to limited amounts of earnings annually put aside for re-
tirement, but do not enjoy the benefit of excluding these amounts from
188 See id. at 4-5 (arguing that the tax treatment of IRAs is overly generous for
individuals who participate in other tax-preferred retirement arrangements, namely
high-income taxpayers, and thus results in "a direct erosion of the tax base, requiring
higher tax rates").
The requirement of revenue neutrality in the 1986 legislation caused the direct
linkage of tax rates and tax expenditures in the retirement savings context. This
linkage has made indisputable the contention of tax expenditure critics that income tax
reductions such as those effected by the Act ultimately must be paid for by higher taxes
on those who do not benefit. The potential distributional consequences, therefore, of
income tax incentives for retirement savings utilized predominately by higher income
taxpayers call into question not only the fairness of such incentives themselves, but also
of the routine practice of ignoring the existence of such incentives when assessing the
overall fairness of our public retirement security policies.
189 See FIRST DECADE, supra note 85, at 124-25.
190 See id. at 126-127; see also 1 DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 74, at 106-07 (not-
ing lack of increase in aggregate national savings).
191 Under the Tax Reform Act, workers still can contribute relatively substantial
amounts to Keogh plans ($7000) or cash or deferred compensation arrangements
("CODAs") ($7000) without subjecting themselves or their employers to the more
stringent regulation of a qualified plan. See I.R.C. §§ 219(b) (Keogh plans); 402(g)(1)
(CODAs) (West Supp. 1987); see also EBRI, IRAs, supra note 20, at 9 (rates of
participation).
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current income. 19 2
Taxpayers, however, may employ two basic strategies that have
the potential to undermine the retirement security advantages of the
1986 IRA revisions. First, they may attempt to retain (or in some cases
even increase) the pre-1986 tax benefits of IRAs by shifting to other
tax-deductible forms of retirement savings. Second, they may endeavor
to achieve the post-1986 IRA benefits while avoiding the IRA restric-
tions limiting dollar amounts eligible for tax-free investment returns
and restricting the tax-free investment build-up to savings for retire-
ment. Alternative forms of tax-preferred savings, therefore, may under-
mine the efficacy of the 1986 limitations.
In addition to IRAs, there exist provisions that allow employees to
make their own contributions to retirement savings plans in lieu of re-
ceiving cash salary and, by so doing, to achieve tax savings comparable
to those available under the 1981-86 law for IRAs and currently avail-
able for employer contributions to employer-sponsored pension plans.
The most important of these salary reduction plans are so-called section
401(k) plans, commonly known as cash or deferred arrangements (CO-
DAs).19 3 Even more generous optional salary reduction plans are avail-
able to employees of certain tax-exempt institutions under other sec-
tions of the Internal Revenue Code.""4 These plans are subject to a
variety of constraints, along the lines of rules applicable to employer
pension plan contributions, principally designed to allow employees op-
portunities for additional tax-preferred retirement savings so long as
these opportunities are not limited to high earning employees.
From the perspective of national retirement security policy, the
critical issue with respect to CODAs is whether, on balance, these tax
preferences stimulate additional net increases to retirement savings by
encouraging savings for retirement that would not otherwise occur or
whether these plans serve as substitutes for employer contributions to
pension plans that would discriminate less in favor of high earners.1 95
192 See I.R.C. § 408(o) (West Supp. 1987); see also FINANCE COMM., supra note
167, at 544.
1 1 See I.R.C. § 401(k) (West Supp. 1987). For a discussion of the operation of
§ 401(k) plans, see generally Halperin, supra note 10.
19 See I.R.C. § 403(b) (West Supp. 1987) (allowing annual contributions to tax-
sheltered annuities) ; see also I.R.C. § 402(g)(4) (West Supp. 1987) (raising limit on
such contributions from $7000 to $9500); I.R.C. § 457 (West Supp. 1987) (allowing
government organizations to gain some tax advantages through the use of unfunded
deferred compensation plans); I.R.C. § 501(c)(18) (West Supp. 1987) (allowing
nongovernment tax-exempt organizations to establish pension plans that qualify for
some tax advantages without requiring such plans to meet strict nondiscrimination
standards).
18" See Halperin, supra note 10, at 160-63; Wolk, supra note 23, at 429-34.
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Without going into detail here, protection of the national retirement
security system seems to demand that, to be eligible for tax-favored
treatment, salary reduction plans should be required to satisfy nondis-
crimination tests similar to those applicable to employer plans. In addi-
tion, the maximum savings under such plans should be substantially
lower than that possible with respect to employer-provided retirement
savings so that high-income employees will continue to have incentives
to promote employer plans."98 The 1986 legislation attempts to achieve
both goals by tightening nondiscrimination requirements for CODAs
and limiting the maximum annual elective deferral of compensation
under such plans to $7000 annually, including any amounts added to
an IRA. 197 Where made available, however, salary reduction plans of-
198 The following table estimates 1983 distribution of participants of pension
plans, IRAs, and 401(k) plans by income class:
Distribution of Pension, 401(k), and IRA
Participants by Earnings
Distribution Distribution Distribution
of Pension of 401(k) of IRA
Covered Partic- Partic-
Personal Percent of Workersa pantsb pantsc
Earnings All workers (percent) (percent) (percent)
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
$1-4,999 12.7 2.0 d. 5.8
$5,000-9,999 19.0 9.2 4.8 9.8
$10,000-14,999 21.9 21.3 14.8 14.6
$15,000-19,999 16.0 21.0 18.4 16.3
$20,000-24,999 12.6 18.8 18.5 14.8
$25,000-29,999 6.8 10.2 13.6 11.4
$30,000-49,999 8.5 13.5 22.4 19.2
$50,000 and over 2.5 3.9 6.8 8.0
a. Data for 1983 pension coverage. Coverage is defined as 1983 employment in a pen-
sion-covered job. Workers who did not meet ERISA standards for participation in 1983
(i.e., part-time or part-year workers and workers under age 25) may not have been
eligible to participate in pension plans.
b. 401(k) plan participation in 1983 among private-sector workers. Data exclude
401(k) and 403(b) plan participation among public-sector workers.
c. IRA participation in tax year 1982.
d. Number too small to be calculated reliably.
Source: EBRI, IRAs, supra note 20, at 9 table 5 (figures taken from EBRI tabulation
in the May 1983 EBRIIDepartment of Health and Human Services, Current Popula-
tion Survey pension supplement).
19I See I.R.C. § 402(g) (West Supp. 1987); see also EBRI, TAx REFORM, supra
note 164, at 22 (discussing new limitations on deferred compensation arrangements).
The 1986 legislation seeks to assimilate the role of individual retirement savings
into a unified retirement security policy in a variety of other provisions as well. Tax-
deferred annuity plans offered by charitable organizations, public schools, colleges, or
universities, for example, also are brought more closely into conformity with qualified
employer-provided pension plans with respect to coverage, nondiscrimination, with-
drawal, and distribution provisions. A special annual $9500 contribution limit is also
included. See I.R.C. § 402(g) (West Supp. 1987). These new limits are substantially
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fer employees opportunities for discretionary tax-preferred retirement
savings in excess of the pre-1986 IRA limits. These opportunities may
create a significant potential for employees to avoid the cutbacks in
IRA deductions of the 1986 legislation."' 8
Despite these potential gaps, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 reflects
a major effort to rationalize the rules governing employer-provided
pension plans, IRAs, and salary reduction plans through an indepen-
dent assessment of these programs in terms either of tax policy or re-
tirement security policy. Further, by limiting availability of IRAs and
maximum deductible employee contributions to salary reduction plans,
the 1986 legislation should provide some protection for employer-pro-
vided pension plans from accelerating encroachment by more individu-
alized retirement savings vehicles. This protection should strengthen the
relationships among the alternative arrangements for tax-preferred re-
tirement savings from the perspective of a unified retirement security
policy. As noted, however, the efficacy of these retirement savings in-
centives, both as an independent stimulus to retirement savings and as a
lower than the new maximum annual deductions available under qualified employer-
provided pension plans. For example, under defined contribution plans the 1986 Act
provides a maximum annual contribution of $30,000, to be adjusted in subsequent
years for inflation. See EBRI, TAx REFORM, supra note 164, at 22 (comparing prior
limits and the Tax Reform Act changes). The 1986 Act changes with respect to salary
reduction plans also exemplify the tendency toward a national retirement security pol-
icy. These changes were intended to rationalize better the relationship between IRAs,
salary reduction plans, and employer-sponsored pension plans and to inhibit further
trends in the direction of substituting salary reduction plans for pension coverage.
' Other opportunities to avoid these cutbacks in IRA deductions continue to ex-
ist. In some cases, for example, high-income earners may opt for so-called nonqualified
forms of deferred compensation. In practice, however, these arrangements tend to be
limited to certain types of high-income employees or to employees of closely held com-
panies. Nonqualified deferred compensation does not explicitly enjoy tax savings com-
parable to that available with a qualified plan. For example, tax deferral on contribu-
tions is available with nonqualified plans, but tax-free interest build-up is not. Since
these plans are not formally funded by the employer, the employee takes some risk by
relying on the credit of the employer in order to defer tax on a portion of compensation.
See Halperin, supra note 10, at 188-90. Nonqualified deferred compensation may,
however, allow high earning employees to achieve some tax savings without becoming
subject to the regulatory requirements applicable to qualified plans.
In addition, stock options from time to time have enjoyed tax preferred treatment
and sometimes may have served as a substitute for savings through qualified pension
plans for a limited number of high earners. See The Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 251(a), 95 Stat. 172, 256 (1981) (current version at I.R.C.
§ 422A(a) (1982 & West Supp. 1987)) (providing special tax treatment of employee
incentive stock options). Such options are not taxable at the time they are granted or
exercised, and the employee receives capital gains treatment on the sale of the stock. See
M. GRAETZ, supra note 28, at 808. Although these stock options will be less attractive
given the repeal of capital gains treatment, see Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-514, § 301(a), 100 Stat. 2085 (1986) (repealing I.R.C. § 1202 (1982)); I.R.C.
§ 422A(a) (1982 & West Supp. 1987) (incentive stock options), eligible high income
employees can still defer part of their taxable income through this method.
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complement to social security and employer-provided pensions, may
also depend on (1) whether there are other less restrictive tax-favored
means of savings that could constrict the desirability either of IRAs or
salary reduction plans for middle- and high-income workers, and (2)
the extent to which opportunities to borrow to fund such tax-preferred
retirement savings plans potentially undermine the entire tax expendi-
ture structure.
B. Income Tax Incentives for Other Savings
As the next step in this examination of income tax provisions im-
plementing national retirement security policy, this Article will consider
a few options for tax-preferred individual savings that are not restricted
to savings for retirement. The existence of tax-preferred savings oppor-
tunities not explicitly directed toward retirement may serve to enhance
the total amount of individual savings during a person's working years
and thus may stimulate a greater amount of savings available for
spending during retirement than otherwise would have been the case.
On the other hand, the existence of opportunities for tax-preferred sav-
ings not directed toward retirement-by allowing taxpayers equivalent
tax reductions through less restrictive alternatives-may inhibit the
ability of Congress to fashion those restrictions on tax-preferred retire-
ment savings that would best serve national retirement security policy.
This potential deflection of savings may affect employer-sponsored
plans as well as individual retirement savings. Income tax preferences
for state and local bond interest, home ownership, and life insurance
illustrate this tension.
A detailed look at these tax preferences for savings is outside the
scope of this Article. Suffice it to say, all three enjoy significant tax
advantages. Interest income on bonds issued by state and local govern-
ments is exempt from income tax,199 and, where the interest differential
between taxable and tax-exempt bonds of comparable risk is small,200
this exemption affords a tax-free investment return similar to that
available to post-1986 IRA contributions, with much greater liquidity
and without dollar limitations. By the same token, all of the real and
imputed income from owner-occupied housing (the returns to equity
and the annual rental value) is, in effect, tax exempt, and deductions
for interest and property taxes may produce a negative tax on income
'9 See I.R.C. §§ 103, 141-150 (West Supp. 1987).
20 As of March 31, 1987, for example, yields on 20-year tax-exempt bonds were
approximately 94% of yields on 20-year Treasury bonds. See Wall St. J., Mar. 31,
1987, at 24, col. 2 (tax-exempt bonds), 35, col. 2 (Treasury bonds).
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from owner-occupied housing."' 1 Similarly, the exemption from current
taxation of investment income earned by individuals in connection with
reserves on savings through life insurance products offers a widely
available means of tax-free savings, not limited in amount.202
Options to save through investments in tax-exempt bonds, home
ownership, or life insurance, therefore, may offer individuals significant
opportunities to achieve tax reductions comparable to those available
after 1986 to individual retirement savings accounts, but without sub-
jecting them to the retirement savings restrictions. There are no maxi-
mum limitations on the annual investments eligible for such benefits
and no restrictions on the time at which funds may be withdrawn from
such savings. While, unlike employer pension plans, these savings pref-
erences are available only for after-tax amounts, there are no delays in
vesting of benefits, no risks of plan termination by the employer, no loss
of benefits when one changes employers, and no nondiscrimination re-
quirements that demand substantially equal treatment for other
individuals.
The ability to save through such vehicles as state and local bonds,
home ownership, and life insurance free from the burdens of income
taxation should serve to enhance the amounts of overall individual sav-
ings of high-income individuals who have discretionary income availa-
ble for such savings during their working years. It is unclear, however,
from the point of view of national retirement security policy, whether
this advantage outweighs the potential effects of the less restrictive tax-
preferred alternative savings opportunities in reducing pressures from
high-income employees for the establishment and maintenance of pri-
vate pension plans and in lowering the status of IRAs and salary re-
duction plans on high-earning employees' lists of savings priorities.
Even after the base broadening changes of the 1986 Tax Reform Act,
the continued vitality of such nonretirement savings incentives in the
income tax seems assured. While this should ease policymakers' con-
cerns about the need to provide new tax preferences to ensure that
high-income individuals have tax-preferred opportunities to save as a
means of achieving lifestyle maintenance during their retirement, it also
serves to limit significantly the potential efficacy of severely restricting
opportunities for high income individuals to enjoy tax-preferred savings
2I The estimated revenue loss from the deductibility of mortgage interest on
owner-occupied homes was $27.1 billion in 1986 and is projected to rise from $33 bil-
lion in 1987 to $51.5 billion in 1991. Revenue loss from the deductibility of property
tax is estimated to reach $9.6 billion in 1987, increasing to $16 billion in 1991. See
TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 21, at 155, 159; see also E. STEUERLE, supra note
34, at 70-71 (noting possibility of achieving a negative tax).
202 See E. STEUERLE, supra note 34, at 72-73.
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for retirement.
The continued existence of tax preferences for nonretirement sav-
ings, at a minimum, emphasizes the importance of directing incentives
for creating and maintaining retirement pension plans at employers
rather than relying principally on exhortations from middle- and high-
income employees as a stimulus to such plans. Such nonretirement in-
come tax savings incentives also make apparent the risks inherent in
relying predominantly on income tax incentives as a means of imple-
menting national retirement security policy, risks that seem even
greater when the possibility of borrowing is taken into account.
C. Effects of Borrowing on Tax Expenditures for Retirement
Savings
In recent years, tax analysts have offered analyses of the relation-
ships between borrowing and tax incentives.2 °3 A phenomenon labeled
"tax arbitrage" has been identified from the practice of borrowing and
subsequently making deductible interest payments to purchase or carry
assets that produce tax-preferred income.2"4 Although there have been
numerous studies of this phenomenon in recent years, there remains
considerable dispute over the effect of tax arbitrage on the equity and
efficiency of tax expenditures.0 5 The impact of coupling borrowing
and tax-preferred assets varies depending on whether the tax prefer-
ences have the effect of reducing the pretax rate of return on the tax-
preferred asset. Borrowing to purchase or carry tax-exempt state and
local bonds is exemplary.208 A second type of tax arbitrage, labeled by
Eugene Steuerle as "pure tax arbitrage," occurs when taxpayers are
able to borrow to purchase or carry tax-preferred assets whose pretax
rate of return has not been reduced. The retirement security tax prefer-
ences offer important opportunities for pure tax arbitrage.20 7 Such op-
portunities may both defeat the retirement security goals of the income
tax expenditures for retirement savings and undermine distributional
goals of tax policy. An example demonstrates this point.
Assume that an individual borrows money from a bank and depos-
203 See, e.g., id. at 57-80; Steuerle, Tax Arbitrage, Inflation, and the Taxation of
Interest Payments and Receipts, 30 WAYNE L. REv. 991 (1984); Warren, Accelerated
Capital Recovery, Debt, and Tax Arbitrage, 38 TAx LAW. 549 (1985).
20 See E. STEUERLE, supra note 34, at 59.
205 See, e.g., Savings and Retirement Proposals: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Finance, 97 Cong., 1st Sess. 65-68 (1982) (statement of J. Chapoton) (de-
ferred annuities must be reformed to reduce tax arbitrage); E. STEUERLE, supra note
34, at 61-77; Warren, supra note 203, at 568-74.
200 See E. STEUERLE, supra note 34, at 72.
207 See id. at 60-61. See also Andrews & Bradford, supra note 85.
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its the money in an IRA either with the same bank or another bank.
For simplicity, assume that the interest paid on borrowing is identical
to that earned by the IRA, say 8%. The taxpayer will achieve an over-
all tax reduction by deducting the interest payment on the borrowing,
while excluding or deferring from taxation the IRA receipts. Note that
in this case there has been no increase in savings either by the individ-
ual or in the aggregate. Liabilities and assets have increased by an
equal amount both in the economy and for the individual. A taxpayer
in the 28% bracket who could engage in $10,000 of borrowing and
asset transactions would save $224 in tax even though she did not add
anything to her net savings. This $224 tax savings is identical to what
would have occurred if that taxpayer had put $10,000 of new savings
in an account that earned a tax-exempt 8%. This means that the full
tax reduction designed to stimulate retirement savings may be available
to taxpayers who can borrow even though no additional net savings
have been made available either to the economy generally or to the
individual for spending during retirement.
Borrowing to purchase pension assets, salary reduction assets,
IRAs, and life insurance all may offer opportunities for the pure tax
arbitrage described in the preceding example. The tax and savings ef-
fects described above will occur whether the individual borrows directly
from the tax-preferred assets or, alternatively, whether the taxpayer
borrows from an unrelated lender. This means that limitations on bor-
rowing from IRAs, salary reduction plans, or pension funds will be
effective, at most, in precluding pure tax arbitrage only for those tax-
payers who do not have other borrowing sources.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 suggests the first steps towards lim-
iting the potential amounts of tax arbitrage. For example, the Act
reduces the maximum amount of annual tax-preferred retirement sav-
ings, constricts taxpayers' abilities to borrow from retirement savings
assets, and limits the deductibility of interest in connection with bor-
rowing to purchase or carry tax-preferred retirement security assets.208
In combination, these restrictions should inhibit the aggregate ability of
taxpayers to undermine retirement security policies by engaging in bor-
rowing transactions. They do not, however, eliminate all opportunities
for pure tax arbitrage. Such opportunities will remain available, for
example, for those individuals who can use home equity loans to bor-
118 See I.R.C. §§ 67, 163 (West Supp. 1987) (preserving ability to deduct interest
payments on home mortgages and, consequently, allowing for tax arbitrage); see also
EBRI, TAx REFORM, supra note 164, at 14-18 (discussing changes in contributions to
and distributions from qualified plans).
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row without losing the advantage of interest deductibility. 09 The re-
strictions on tax arbitrage will likely have the greatest effect on those
taxpayers whose ability to borrow is constrained. This means that low-
and moderate-income individuals, who may be unable to borrow addi-
tional amounts in a manner that produces deductible interest payments,
will be eligible for the income tax expenditures directed to retirement
savings only if they actually increase net savings for retirement. On the
other hand, high-income taxpayers may continue to have arbitrage op-
portunities that will enable them to take full advantage of the retire-
ment security income tax preferences without adding at all to their re-
tirement savings. This state of affairs not only raises additional
questions about both the fairness and efficacy of relying on income tax
preferences for retirement savings as a major element of our national
retirement security policy-particularly given the reliance of the cur-
rent system on high-income level employees to stimulate employer
plans-but also further skews the distribution of the income tax advan-
tages in the direction of high earners.
CONCLUSION
Analyzing social security and income tax preferences for em-
ployer-sponsored pension plans and individual retirement savings as a
comprehensive retirement security package calls into question much of
the common wisdom regarding our national retirement security pro-
gram.210 The income tax benefits that are skewed in the direction of
high-income individuals render inexcusable the dramatic regressivity of
the payroll tax to finance social security. A floor to exempt low-income
workers from social security tax burdens, at least once a minimum
number of quarters to ensure benefits has been accumulated, would be
a significant improvement in the fairness of the payroll tax. The earned
income tax credit of the income tax remains inadequate to this task,
even after its 1986 expansion. When the distribution of income tax
benefits for private retirement savings are taken into account, the pay-
roll tax ceiling that reduces the burden of the wage tax for the less than
5% of employees with wages in excess of $43,000 also becomes indefen-
209 See I.R.C. §§ 67, 163 (West Supp. 1987). The ability to deduct interest pay-
ments on home mortgages leads to the tax-induced behavior discussed above. See supra
note 201 and accompanying text.
210 For an example of a more positive judgment regarding the appropriateness of
tax expenditures for private pensions that fails to reflect such a comprehensive view, see
Graetz & McDowell, Tax Reform 1985: The Quest for a Fairer, More Efficient and
Simpler Income Tax, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REv 5, 15 (1984). In addition, the compre-
hensive analysis suggested here calls into question the usefulness of making inquiries
such as that contained in Boskin, Kotlikoff, Puffert, & Shoven, supra note 2, at 26-27.
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sible. Income tax-favored benefits for retirement, as well as other sav-
ings vehicles that favor high-level wage earners, are sufficiently great so
as to obviate serious consideration of arguments that the elimination of
the payroll tax ceiling would require an extraordinary increase in the
maximum social security benefit.
The income tax contains massive tax benefits intended to stimulate
voluntary employer-sponsored pension plans and discretionary individ-
ual savings for retirement. These massive subsidies can be justified only
because Social Security provides an inadequate level of wage replace-
ment for workers in all income classes. The analysis of this Article,
however, demonstrates that reliance on tax expenditures for voluntary
employer and individual retirement savings plans is highly questionable
as a means of furthering national retirement security policy. The tax
expenditure mechanism is naturally skewed in favor of high-earners,
and it is not at all clear that even substantial tightening of the condi-
tions necessary to obtain such tax benefits, such as were contained in
both the 1974 and 1986 legislation, will be sufficient to guarantee a
distribution of benefits that is fair to the low- and moderate-income
workers who should have first claim on public subsidies for retirement
savings. The ability to ensure a fair distribution of benefits is con-
strained by the voluntariness of the system, by the necessary prospect
that the details of retirement security income tax expenditures will be
held hostage to overriding fiscal or tax policy concerns, and by the use
of tax planning-particularly borrowing in this instance-to under-
mine public policy goals.
The analysis in this Article thus raises the significant question
whether there exists any alternative to extension of mandatory retire-
ment security provisions as a means of ensuring both a fair distribution
of public benefits and adequate retirement income for retirees in all
income classes. The massive re-examinations of the income tax expend-
itures for employer-sponsored pension plans and individual retirement
accounts in 1974 and again in 1986 imply that, although Congress is
willing to go quite far in an effort to ensure some distribution of bene-
fits to low- and moderate-wage earners, tax expenditures to continue
the private pension system seem to have become politically untouchable.
Even the prospect of the 20% or more overall reduction in income tax
rates that might be obtained by repealing these tax expenditures does
not seem sufficient to generate their demise. The restructuring of the
IRA provisions in order to cap the top effective income tax rate at a
percentage lower than 30% seems to be as far as Congress is willing to
go. At the same time, current political attitudes are moving the econ-
omy in the direction of less, rather than more, regulation, and a new
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requirement of mandatory employer-sponsored pension plans does not
seem politically realistic. Thus, as a practical matter, the pressing ques-
tion is whether a better compromise can be achieved.
Without a basic change in the present structure, there seems to be
little hope for genuine retirement income security for moderate-income
employees. Great improvement might be possible by imposing a flat
income tax rate of, say, 10% on the investment income of pension funds
or, alternatively, imposing an excise tax similar to that now imposed on
assets of private foundations equal to, say, 2% of total assets contained
in pension funds, salary reduction accounts, and IRAs, and using and
adding the proceeds of such a tax to the trust fund for Social Security.
Given the almost $1 trillion of assets currently held in pension funds,
Keogh plans, and individual retirement accounts,21 a 2% excise tax on
these assets would produce about $20 billion of revenues. These reve-
nues, in combination with the elimination of the payroll tax wage ceil-
ing recommended above, could be used to provide current payroll tax
relief to the working poor and to provide funds that would move signif-
icantly in the direction of 100% wage replacement for low- and moder-
ate-income retirees. At the same time, the opportunities for higher in-
come individuals to save through both employer-sponsored plans and
tax-favored discretionary savings would continue.
Whether or not a substantial change of this sort is taken, greater
attention must be given to tightening opportunities for tax savings in
the absence of any significant retirement savings. In this connection, the
problems that arise from coupling tax-preferred retirement savings with
borrowing must be considered further in an effort to limit tax prefer-
ences for retirement savings to those instances where an actual net ad-
dition to retirement savings actually occurs.
"I1 By the end of 1985, total assets held in IRA and Keogh Accounts were esti-
mated to be $222.4 billion. See EBRI, IRAs, supra note 20, at 7 chart 3. By the end of
1980, total assets held by private pensions had risen to over $400 billion. See A. MUN-
NELL, supra note 4, at 62.
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